

THE 8026. 55. 65.

Dangers of Europe,
 FROM
 The Growing Power
 OF
FRANCE.

WITH
 Some Free Thoughts on REMEDIES.

And Particularly

On the Cure of our DIVISIONS at Home:
 In Order to a Successful WAR Abroad
 against the French King and his Allies.

*Certe quidem vos estis Romani, qui ideo felicia esse bella Vestra, quia iusta sint, pra
 vobis fertis, nec tam exitu eorum, quod vincatis, quam principiis, quod non sine
 causa suscipiatis, gloriamini. Liv. in Rhodiorum Oratione, Lib. 14.*

*Μὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ δίκῳ μὴ ἐκείνῳ ὁ Θεός. i. e. Abs quo stat jus, ab eo Deus. Joseph.
 Antiq. 15.*

By the Author of, *The Duke of Anjou's Succession considered.*

The Second Edition.

L O N D O N:

Printed, and Sold by A. Baldwin, in Warwick-Lane. 1702.



THE
MUSEUM

OF
THE
CITY OF
NEW YORK

AND
THE
COUNTY OF
NEW YORK

1875

THE PREFACE.

Since the writing of the following Sheets, the Causes of our Alarm are increased. As the French King before the sitting down of our last Parliament, made himself Master of the Spanish Netherlands, which England has always looked upon to be of the greatest Consequence for her own Preservation, he hath now, just before the Meeting of our ensuing Parliament, made himself Master of the Town and Principality of Liege, and of all the Places of Strength in the Electorat of Cologne, the Capital of that Name excepted, which is likewise in great danger. This looks as if he design'd to affront our Parliaments, and to lessen the Esteem of this Nation in the Eyes of Europe. 'Tis well enough known, that when our King and Parliaments had a good Understanding, there was nothing in the World so awful to that Haughty and Perfidious Monarch, as the English Nation, but our late unhappy Divisions, have augmented his Arrogance and makes him despise us. 'Twill be our own Fault if we don't remove that Occasion, especially considering the unsufferable Outrage he is guilty of towards us, in offering to impose an Heir of his own Education and Religion, upon our Crown, contrary to the Acts of Succession, so unanimously agreed to by several Parliaments. This is an Injury of the highest Nature, and the greatest Affront he could put upon his Majesty and the Kingdom. 'Tis a manifest Declaration, that he aims at nothing less than to deprive us of our Sovereignty, & to subvert our Religion and Liberty, which can never be effected without the Destruction of the present Race of Englishmen, and an Entailment of Slavery upon all succeeding Posterity. Thus he requites us for the Treaty of Partition, and for owning his Grandson, the Duke of Anjou's Succession to the Crown of

The Preface.

Spain. This makes it evident beyond dispute, that he owns no Obligation of Gratitude to God or Man; and indeed the whole Course of his Reign hath been Treachery and Ingratitude to both.

'Tis in vain to think he can be brought to a contrary Sence or Practice by any posteriour Treaty, and therefore it is hoped this Nation will never come to another with him, but such as shall carry along with it an effectual Security; and that we can never have, till he be reduced to such a Condition, that we shall not need to value him, whether he keep to his Treaties or not.

A great part of the Nation have expressed their Sense, that his unaccountable Proceedings with relation to the Pretender, must be encouraged, by a Party amongst our selves. 'Tis therefore our Concern to make a thorough Enquiry, who they are, and what's their Strength. It may be our happiness, if rightly improved, that he hath discovered his treacherous Intentions so early, whilst his Majesty, blessed be God, is alive and capable of fighting our Battles; therefore we shall have none to blame but our selves, if we don't bring him to a more express and particular Article for the Security of our Succession, than the 4th Article of the Treaty of Reswick. 'Twould seem he thinks that too much, since he has not the Patience to stay till his Majesty has run the Natural Course of his Life; but we have much better Reason to think it too little, and seeing he has made bold to break it, it's our part to deny him the Privilege of any future Plea to have it observed, and either to bring him to a better Security of his own accord, or to take it by force.

That we are capable of doing so, if right Measures be taken, is endeavoured to be made evident in the following Sheets, which have no other design but to serve the Publick. They expose the Folly and Danger of our Intestine Divisions, and offer some Expedients towards a Cure; but the whole is submitted to the Wisdom of the Nation in the approaching Parliament, betwixt whom and his Majesty, may there be a perfect Harmony and good Understanding, to the Disappointment of our Enemies at Home and Abroad.

THE
Dangers of Europe,
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IT is evident to all Men of Observation, That the Face of *Europe* looks with as cloudy an Aspect at present, as it has done at any time for these last hundred Years; Nor is it less evident, that *England* has her proportion of those Clouds, which threaten an Universal Storm.

It hath been our Lot and Glory a long time to have the Reputation of being the Arbiters of the Grand Differences of *Christendom*; and it hath as long been in our power to carry the Ballance which way we would. Nor can it be denied that this Nation, when suffered to act according to its own Natural Genius, hath ever espoused the Juster Side.

Yet it must be owned, that we have sometimes had the Unhappiness, as well as other Nations, to act contrary both to our own Interest, and to that of our Neighbours; but this has been more owing to those that were at the Helm, than either to the Ignorance or ill Intentions of the People of *England*.

There are now the greatest Controversies depending betwixt the two chief Powers of *Europe*, that ever we or our Fathers heard of; and they are like to be disputed with greater Force and Warmth, than any other Controversie that hath yet troubled the Western World, or perhaps the Universe. This makes it evident, that we are more concerned than ever to act with Vigor, if we have a mind either to preserve the Honour of keeping the Ballance even betwixt the two contending Parties, or to enjoy the Advantage of securing to our selves the Blessings of Peace and Prosperity.

In order to be satisfied, as to this Matter, we are, First, to take a View of Affairs Abroad, and then to cast an Eye upon those at Home.

As to Foreign Affairs, we must consider them, as they respect *Europe* in General; and then, as they relate to Us in particular.

As they respect *Europe* in General, we are to consider.

1. That the French stand now possessed of the Dominions of *Spain*, which, together with their own Dominions, make up the greatest Power, that ever was under the Government of any one Western Prince or Court, since the Fall of the Roman Empire.

2. That by the seizure of the Spanish Succession, the French King hath made a greater and more successful Step towards the Universal Monarchy, than ever any other Prince did since the Days of *Julius Caesar*.

3. That

3. That *Louis XIV.* is Master of a far greater Force, by Sea and Land, has more disciplined and warlike Troops, a greater Number of experienced Generals to command them, and a greater Treasure to maintain them, than any Prince ever yet had, that attempted to bring the World under the Jurisdiction of one Scepter.

4. That whether it be by Infatuation, or the ill Genius of *Europe*, or, to speak more like Christians, by the overruling Hand of Divine Providence, to punish slavish and wicked Nations, it is undeniable that he has a greater Number of Subjects, ready to follow him blindfold, and to sacrifice their Lives and Fortunes to his Ambition, than any other Prince ever yet had.

5. That he hath had and still has a greater Faculty and Success, by Bribery, and otherwise, to bring other Princes and People to fall in with his Measures, though apparently destructive to their own Interest, than all those together that formerly aspired to the Universal Monarchy.

Of this, there can be no doubt left in our Minds, if we consider how successful he has been in bribing and bewitching several of our own Princes and Ministers of State, the former by Means of their Paramours, by furnishing them Money to prevent the Necessity of calling Parliaments, and by Promises to support them in their Arbitrary Designs; and the latter, by advancing them Summs, by espousing their Interests, and by enabling 'em to appear at the Head of those Factions, which the Wickedness of our Courts and the Weakness of our Clergy, Nobility and Gentry have raised and admitted amongst us. The Design of the former was to divide us, that they might govern us with a more absolute Sway; and the Design of the latter was, that by their Interest in this or that prevailing Faction they might make themselves the more necessary to their Prince, and by Consequence more deserving of his Favour and Bounty; without considering, or at least regarding that

they purchase this Temporary Favour for the most part, at the rate of their Countries Liberty, and by Consequence, with the ruine of their own Posterity.

It were easie to shew that the French have practis'd the same Methods among Foreign Nations, but it's sufficient only to mention the way how they have acquir'd the Crown of *Spain*, the Success they have had in buying off the Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologne*, and other Princes of the Empire; the Influence they have had in procuring a Party in *Holland* to oppose a War, and to own the Duke of *Anjou* as King of *Spain*, and their dexterity in kindling a Flame in the North and keeping it hitherto from being extinguished.

6. In the 6th place we are to consider the French King in his Alliances, and the other Advantages he hath acquir'd by his seizure of the Crown of *Spain*, which are as follows.

1. By this means he hath secured himself on the side of *Spain*, which, though but an enfeebled Monarchy, yet in the late War put him to vast Expences, by obliging him to send Armies to *Catalonia*, &c. and to be on his Guard every where else upon his Frontiers towards that Kingdom; which was a mighty Diversion to his Mony and Troops. This he has now in a great Measure delivered himself from, or at least if he be suffered to continue in possession, (for his Grandson is no other than his Lieutenant) it will be a great Advantage to himself or any future King of *France*, to be secured on that side.

2. By this means he hath an opportunity to secure himself of the Kingdom of *Navarre*, and to annex it to the Crown of *France*, which alone, considering its situation, will be of great Advantage to him and as great an Annoyance to *Spain*, in case of any Rupture betwixt those two Kingdoms; because it opens his Passage into the very heart of *Spain*. And likewise when Affairs come to be a little settled, and that he thinks it proper for him to demand that
King:

Kingdom of the Spaniards, as his undoubted Right, they cannot with any good Grace deny him a Monarchy of his own, who hath been so kind to them to prevent theirs from being dismembred, and also to preserve their other Conquests to them, or if they do, he knows how to take it, whether they will or not.

3. By this means he hath depriv'd those that Confederate against him, of all the Spanish Harbours, which is another great Advantage towards his being possess'd of the Dominion of the *Mediterranean*, and makes him at the same time the Sole, or at least the greatest Proprietor of the *Straits* and *Levant* Trade; which hath been so very profitable to *England* and *Holland*.

4. By this means he not only secures himself against a War with the *Spaniards*, but engages them to be his Allies, (if not Subjects) in any future Wars; for now Experience hath convinc'd the World, that the Government of *Spain* is in the Hands of *France*, as 'twas rationally alledg'd, it would be: By this, it appears how ill founded the opinion of those Gentlemen was that endeavour'd to hush our Allarms upon that surprizing Event, by telling us, that the *Spaniards* would never endure it, and that the Duke of *Anjou* would become as much a *Spaniard*, as were the former Princes of the House of *Austria*.

5. By this means he hath frightned the King of *Portugal* into an Alliance with himself and *Spain*, for fear of losing his Crown and Dignity: So that if a timely stop be not put to his Progress, he will not only totally secure himself on that side of *Europe*, but will engage the *Spaniards* and *Portuguese* in his Interests and Quarrels, and make himself unattackable in those Parts by Sea and Land.

6. By his possessing himself of the Crown of *Spain*, he hath found Means to fix the Duke of *Savoy* inviolably in his Interests, by making his second Daughter Queen of *Spain*. This Step is so much the more considerable, because,

cause. 1. It secures the King of *France* on that side against the most expensive War he could be engag'd in, and against which, he is the worst provided, for his Country lies more open, and unguarded in those Parts than any where else. 2. It gives him a free Passage into *Italy* by Land, whilst the Emperor must be oblig'd for the same to other Potentates that are not under the like Obligations to allow it him. 3. It secures him the Assistance of one of the greatest Princes in *Italy*, who is thereby made so much the more considerable that his Dominions lye contiguous to the *Milanesse*, which belonging to his Son-in-Law the King of *Spain*, must needs advance an Amicable Correspondence betwixt that Prince and the Dutchy of *Milan*, that he must now look upon as the Inheritance of his own Posterity.

7. By this means the *French* King becomes Master of the Kingdoms of *Naples*, *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, which is a very great Point gain'd. 1. Because it incloses the rest of *Italy* and by Consequence over-aws the other Princes and States of that Country, and obliges them to be very observing and careful in their Measures, for they know they are within the Paws of the Lyon, who can tear them to pieces at his Pleasure. The Effects of this are very discernable already, by the Compliance of the Pope and *Genoesse*. The latter have granted him Harbours for his Shipping and passage for his Troops; and have likewise agreed to lend him Money. They know by fatal Experience, that he can easily pick Quarrels with them, and make 'em redeem 'emselves from a Bombardment by opening their Purfes, which would sink both Principal and Interest, and look with a much worse Grace, than a Loan tho' extorted, because now they can have Paper Security, which at some time or other they may find a way to make Valid, by themselves or their Allies. As to the Pope, it is evident from his Compliance in owning the King of *Spain's* Title to the Kingdom

dom of *Naples*, tho' he hath not yet granted him the Investiture, that he dreads the Power of *France*. What fatal Influence the French King's having the Pope at his Devotion, will have on the Affairs of *Europe* may be readily conceived by those who consider the Authority of the See of *Rome* over all those of the Popish Perswasion. This is no less than an actual investing of the Crown of *France*, both with the Temporal and Spiritual Sword, for henceforward if *Louis XIV.* be suffered to go on, we must look upon the Pope to be no other than first Chaplain of State, to the French King, for he will take upon him to dispose of the Pontifical Chair to his own Creatures without a possibility of Control. What mighty Influence may this have on *Christendom*, when *Louis XIV.* and his Successors shall not only have the good things of this World, but likewise those of the other to confer upon their Friends and Adherents : By this means they shall not only become absolute on Earth, but share the very Empire of Heaven, for nothing less is ascribed to the Keys of *St. Peter* by the Canon Law, and blind superstitious Popelings. If this be the Case, we may expect in a few Years to have all those call'd *Roman Catholics*, undertake a Croisado against the Opposers of *France*, as an infallible Means to obtain a free Pass to Heaven, without being oblig'd to call at Purgatory by the way.

There is still another considerable Advantage accruing to the French King by being Master of the Spanish Dominions in *Italy*, which is that he becomes thereby enabled more effectually to assist his ancient Allie the *Turk* to ruine the *German* Empire. All the Spanish Harbours of *Italy* are now at his Command, from whence by a short Transport and easie Marches, he may invade the Emperor's Dominions in *Croatia* and *Hungary*, which he could not do before, and besides, by being possess'd of the Dutchy of *Milan*, he has an opportunity of invading the Empire on that side, by the way.

way of *Trent* and *Tirol*, so that in a small compass of Years, he may attempt the Execution of his Project to divide the World betwixt himself and the Grand Senior, which was represented to us some Years before the Peace, by the French King and the Grand Seniors having the Globe plac'd betwixt them, which they were cutting asunder with a Saw.

We come next to consider the Advantages which accrue to the French King on this side of *Europe*, by his seizure of the Crown of *Spain*, which are,

1. His being Master of the Spanish *Netherlands*, by which I include the Dutchy of *Luxemburg*. This is a thing of such vast Consequence, that the mischievous Effects of it are like to be sooner felt than conceiv'd, That he would possess himself of that Country was easie to be foreseen, and the Consequences of it have been frequently inculcated, the Effects that it hath already produc'd, are these that follow. 1. The obliging of the *Dutch*, to evacuate the Garisons which they had in that Country, as a Security for the Money they advanc'd to the King of *Spain*, during the late War, and by this they are hector'd at once, both out of their Money and Defence. 2. This oblig'd the *Dutch* to own the Duke of *Anjou* as King of *Spain*; that they might recover their Troops; which the *French* would have otherwise detain'd, and that they might have time to secure their Frontiers, and strengthen themselves by Alliances. 3. This hath given the French King an opportunity of building new Forts, and of casting up new Lines almost under the Canon of the *Dutch* Garisons, by which he hath shut them up within their own Country, depriv'd them of their natural Barrier, and put a Curb in their Jaws, which they cannot easily get rid off. 4. This hath oblig'd them to be at an insupportable Expence of raising a mighty Army of their own and Foreign Troops, to equip a great Fleet, and to purchase Foreign Alliances, and yet all

all this is not enough, but they have likewise been forc'd to lay a great part of their Country under Water, to prevent the Incursions of the *French*. 6. This hath oblig'd us in *England* to be at the Trouble and Expence of sending over 10000 Men, and of Equipping a Squadron to assist the *Dutch*, according to the Treaty of 1677, and it enables the French King more than ever to dispute the Sovereignty of the narrow Seas with us. 7. For any thing that can be discerned to the contrary. The French King's seising of *Flanders*, which hath always been look'd upon to be a natural Barrier to us, as well as to the States, must in all probability have had some Influence upon our owning the Duke of *Anjou* as King of *Spain*, notwithstanding any Reasons, which from our Honour and Interest might have been alledg'd against it. 8. It is not to be doubted, but the French King's seising of *Flanders*, did very much animate the Enemies of the Government, to those well known Insolencies they were guilty of, against all those of the Revolution Principles, whom they run down in such a manner as 'twas easie to be discerned, that 'twas the Party they aim'd at, and not the punishment of Faults, which had they been prov'd ought indeed to have been severely censured. 10. The French King by being Master of the Spanish *Netherlands*, is possess'd of a Country, which is known by Experience to be the most capable of bearing the Burden of vast Armies of any in *Europe*, and abounds most with great and fortified Towns of any Country of its Extent in *Christendom*; as this is a great Advantage to him, it's as great a Loss to us, and the States, who are not only depriv'd of that strong and plentiful Country as a Barrier, and secure place of Retreat upon any Disaster in the Field, but it serves for the same purposes to our most formidable Enemy. 11. It follows naturally from what has been already said, that by this means, the *French* are rendred more capable than ever of Invading *England* and *Holland*;

and of disturbing the Trade of both Countries, and that on the other hand, they are more secure than ever from being invaded by either of us, *Flanders* which was formerly our Barrier, being now become theirs, as has been already mentioned.

8. By his seizure of the *Netherlands*, he hath had an opportunity to buy off two Electors of the Empire: *Bavaria* and *Cologne*, and it has enabled him with more ease than formerly, to invade the Dominions of four other Electors, viz. *Brandenburgh*, *Palatin*, *Treves* and *Ments*. By this means he hath opened his way into the Bowels of the Empire, and put himself in a better Condition to support those Princes who oppose the 9th Electorat, and are for a Neutrality, &c. These are the visible and undeniable Effects of his being possess'd of the Spanish *Netherlands*.

In the next place, let us consider a little more particularly the Advantages which that Monarch reaps, by having the Electors of *Cologne* and *Bavaria* in his Interests. By the former he has an opportunity on pretence of assisting him against his Chapters of *Liege* and *Cologne*; (for that Treacherous, Ungrateful, and Ambitious Prelate hath pick'd Quarrels with both of them on purpose) to enter into their Countries. Those of *Liege* are not able to make any Resistance of themselves, and by being Master of that City and Principality, he blocks up *Mastricht* on one side, opens his way into Dutch *Brabant*, *Limburg* and *Gelderland*, and likewise into the Dutchies of *Cleves* and *Juliers*, and by fortifying *Liege* and *Limberg* makes to himself a strong Barrier on that side, by which he may lay *Aix la Chappelle*, and the Duchy of *Juliers* and *Cleves* under Contribution. In the next place by having the Elector of *Cologne* in his Interests, he secures to himself the Garrisons of *Bonne*, *Keyserwart*, and *Rhinberg*, which that Elector is now possess'd of, by which he blocks up the City of *Cologne* on both sides, in a manner shuts up the Elector *Palatin*.

Palatin in his Capital of *Dusseldorp*, may easily deprive him of his City and Dutchy of *Juliers*, and the Elector of *Brandenburg* of his Capital of *Cleves*, and all that part of the Dutchy on the West side of the *Rhine*, and in a word, not only obstructs the Commerce of that River, which is so necessary and advantagious to *Germany* and *Holland*, but from *Bonne* may open his Passage into the very heart of the Empire, which on that side is but ill guarded by Fortresses or strong Towns, and from *Rhineberg* he may fall in thro' the other side of the Dutchy of *Cleve*, upon the back of the United Provinces, Ravage the County of *Zutphen* and Lordship of *Overissel*, or if he think fit to attack the City of *Cologn*, by being Master of *Bonne*, *Keyserfwaert* and *Rhineberg*, he prevents its having any Relief by Water, and that City being of a very large Extent, cannot be defended without a great Army and vast Expence. In the last place, by having the Elector of *Cologn* in his Interest, he assures himself of his Suffrage in the Diet, and deprives the Emperor of it, as has already appear'd in the Cases of the Dukes of *Mantua* and *Savoy*, and in those of the Neutrality and 9th Electorat. This every one knows is of great Consequence, since by this means that Elector has an opportunity of retarding the Emperor's Affairs, of favouring the French King's Interest under hand, and of imbroiling those of the Empire. The importance of this cannot be better understood, than by considering what a few ill Men have in all Reigns been capable to do in our own Parliaments, and how much their palpable opposition to the true Interest of the Nation, or their undermining it secretly by specious Pretences, have contributed towards an Entailment of Slavery upon us and our Posterity.

In the next place, the Advantage accruing to the French King, by having the Elector of *Bavaria* in his Interests, is so great, that it is not at first to be easily seen or conceived. But thus far is plain, that he is one of the greatest

Princes of the Empire, that he is capable of leading an Army, and of raising a considerable Force of his own, that the Situation of his Dominions is such as enables him, to invade the Paternal Inheritance of the House of *Austria* on the one side, and to give Disturbance to the Circles of *Franconia*, *Swabia*, and the *Upper Rhine* on the other, that he is capable of depriving the Emperor of one Suffrage in the Diet and of giving the King of *France* another, and that by the Palatinat of *Bavaria* on the North, and by the Dutchy and Electorat of *Bavaria* on the South, it is in his Power to block up the Diet of the Empire at *Ratisbone*, or to oblige them to remove at his Pleasure. He gave us a proof very lately of what he is capable to do in this Matter, by his entertaining the Deputy of the Circle of *Burgundy*, at a House of his just opposite to *Ratisbone*, when that Deputy was order'd to quit the Diet, and the Dominions of the Empire, and by his numerous Army and great Summs of French Gold, which he receives not under the disgraceful name of a Bribe, but under the specious pretence of being Governor of the Spanish *Netherlands*, he seems capable of opening the French King's Passage to the *Danube*, that he may meet his most dear and natural Allie the Grand Senior before the Walls of *Vienna*. These are a few of the many obvious and pernicious Consequences of the French King's seising the Spanish *Netherlands*; which is enough to strike us with Amazement, that *England* was not more sensible of this in the Close of 1700, and in the beginning of 1701, when the House of Commons was so sensible of our Danger from the French King's taking only a few Towns in the Spanish *Netherlands* in 1677, that they zealously Address'd his Majesty, *To enter into a League Offensive and Defensive with the States General of the United Provinces, against the Power of the French King, and for the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands, and to make such other Alliances with other such of the Confederates as his Majesty*

jeſty ſhould think fit and uſeful for that End The Reaſons of this Addreſs are expreſſ'd in a former, preſented on *March 6* that Year, viz. *That in the Preſervation and Security of the Netherlands, the Intereſt of his Majeſty, and the Safety of his People were highly concerned,* and his Majeſty in his Anſwer owned, *That the Preſervation of Flanders was of great Importance to England.* This being duly conſider'd, we may readily conclude, that that Parliament would neither have allow'd an Indifferency in the Throne, nor have admitted delays among themſelves, had the King of *Spain* been then dead, and the French King actually ſeiz'd, not only of the *Netherlands*, but of the whole *Spaniſh Monarchy*; then ſince it is certainly more the Intereſt of *England* now than it could have been then, to oppoſe the *French* with Vigor, we have but too juſt Reaſon to apprehend, that the Influence of that ſame Party, which then advis'd King *Charles II.* to fruſtrate the Deſires of his People, and to toſs the Parliament from one Adjournment to another, while the French King ſtrengthened himſelf in his new Conqueſts, hath had no ſmall hand in the faintneſs of the Oppoſition, that we have lately made to that Monarch, tho' now arriv'd to a pitch of Power and Grandeur, infinitely above what at that time did ſo much allarm the Nation There's ſtill another conſiderable Advantage, that the French King has by ſeiſing the *Spaniſh Dominions*, which is that it entitles him to the *United Provinces*, and the Kingdom of *Portugal*, and their reſpective Conqueſts in the *East* and *West-Indies*, and there's no doubt, he will lay Claim to them, as ſoon as he finds that the Poſture of his Affairs will bear it.

Having thus taken a brief View of the Advantages accruing to the French King, by his ſeiſure of the *Spaniſh Dominions* in *Europe*. Let us enquire a little into thoſe Advantages that do naturally ariſe to him from his being poſſeſſ'd of their Dominions in *America*, which may be conſidered as follows.

1. By

1. By this means he is possess'd of most of the Fountains of Gold and Silver, or at least of the most considerable Fountains of those Minerals, that are yet known in the World. This is that bottomless and inexhaustible Treasure, with which the lofty Spaniard out-brav'd the Politick *Venetian*, when he shew'd him the vast Summs of Money, which the Senate had in store, in order to deter the *Spaniards* from a War upon the Republick. *This Treasure is great indeed, said the Spaniard, but it has a bottom, whereas my Masters has none.* Then since it is evident that Men and Money are the Sinews of War, and that he who has Money will never want Men; it naturally follows, that if the French King be suffered to continue in possession of the Spanish *West-Indies*, he will be thereby enabled to carry on a War with great probability of Success against the rest of *Europe*. The French King is every whit as well vers'd in the art of Bribery, as in the art of Fighting; and since it is too plain from Experience, that most of his Neighbouring Princes are less capable of resisting his Bribes, than of finding Armour of proof for his Bullets. What is it, that *Europe* has not to fear from the Mines of *Peru* and *Potosi* in the Management of *France*.

2. By this means he is possess'd of the Advantage of depriving *England*, *Holland*, and other Nations of all Trade to the Spanish *West-Indies*, and of engrossing it to himself and his own Subjects. This was foreseen in the Duke of *Anjou's* Succession considered, *Part II. Page 20.* and accordingly he hath already commenced it, by an Agreement to ingross the Slave Trade betwixt himself and the King of *Spain*, and the *French* Company of *Senegal*. The Consequences of this to *England* were pointed at in the same Place, and are obvious to any Man that will allow himself the Freedom of Thought, *viz.* That it will ruine the best part of our *Jamaica* Trade, prevent our having
Bullion

Bullion from the *West-Indies*, by means of our own Plantations, or the Spanish Galeons, and by Consequence, disable us from carrying on our *East-India* Trade, without melting down or exporting our own Coin; and of what mischievous Consequence that may be to the Nation, will sooner be felt than prevented.

It is needless to multiply Words or to insist on many Particulars for there's no Man who is not resolv'd to do Violence to Sense and Reason, but must own, that we shall loose our whole Plantations in *America*, and have all our Country Men in those Parts Butcher'd, Banished, or made Slaves, if the French King be suffered to go on as he has begun.

Let so much suffice, for a brief View of the French King's Power. The next thing to be considered is, the Condition of those who are or should be in opposition to him.

We shall begin with the Emperor, as to whom it may be justly be said, 1. That tho' his Cause be good, his Ability to maintain it is but small 2. That he has the Misfortune to be too much govern'd by Priests, and particularly by Jesuits, who are the bane of Humane Society, undermine and betray all that trust them, and are generally in the Interests of *France*, because *Louis XIV.* has been more Zealous and Succesful in destroying the Reformation, than any other Prince of his time. 3. That as the natural Result of Bigotry and Arbitrary Power, the Emperor's Subjects in *Hungary* and *Transylvania*, are so much oblig'd by the unnatural and barbarous Persecution they have undergone, that they can have no entire Confidence in a Prince, whose Conscience is directed by their sworn Enemies, a Set of Men that will be contented with nothing less than the absolute Ruine of all Protestants, and therefore, the Emperor's Subjects of that Religion are in a great Measure made useless to him, and forc'd to throw themselves from
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time to time, upon the Protection of the *Ottoman* Family, who allow them the Freedom of their Religion, and therefore frequently prevail upon them to join in their Wars against the House of *Austria*. 4. That as Emperor, his Interest is much sunk in the Empire, partly upon the Account of some Incroachments complain'd of, by several Electors and Princes upon their Civil Rights, partly upon the Account of the barbarous Persecution of the Elector *Palatin*, and others against the Protestants of the Empire, which has been frequently complain'd of to his Imperial Majesty, but never as yet redres'd, and partly by the Intrigues and Bribery of the French King, who hath thereby as mentioned already, form'd a very strong Party against him in the Empire. 5. It is very well known, that his Imperial Majesty hath no Naval Force, and that the Dominions of *Spain*, can never be reduc'd under the Scepter of his Family without one. 6. That his Treasure is very much exhausted by the late War against *France* and the *Turk*. 7. That the Empire is in continual Danger of being imbroil'd in its Northern Parts, by the War betwixt the Kings of *Sweden* and *Poland*. 8. That three of the Electors of the *Empire*, and several of its other Princes being Popish Ecclesiasticks, can hardly be suppos'd ever to join cordially with him in a War, for the Success of which he must chiefly rely upon Protestant Assistance. 9. That many of the Princes of the Empire, and particularly those that lye nearest the *French* are but poor and weak, and by Consequence, liable to be hector'd or brib'd into the Interest of *France*. 10. That the Emperor hath been hitherto very unhappy in the Management of his Alliances with *England* and *Holland*, who being disoblig'd by the intemperate Zeal of the Court of *Vienna*, against the Reformation, at the late Treaty of *Reswick*, or otherwise prevail'd upon, God knows how, became engag'd in a first and second Partition against the Honour and Interest of his Family.

We shall in the next place take a View of the United Provinces in our way homeward, concerning whom we may observe, 1. That being a Country that subsists chiefly by Trade, to which, War is certainly ruinous. We are not to wonder if the Trading part of that Country be very averse to it, and by Consequence, obstruct such Resolves as tend to carry it on. 2. That being a People who are very jealous of their Liberty, and knowing that popular Generals at the Head of numerous Armies, do always endanger the Peoples Freedom, it follows naturally, that they should be careful to avoid a War, which gives their Captain Generals such an opportunity, especially considering the Risk that they have run, of being ruined that way oftner than once. 3. That upon this very Head they are divided into Factions, which we may well enough call Republicans and Royalists, for the Souldiery and others, who depend upon the Stadtholder, are for allowing him little, if any thing less than a Regal Power, and the rest are constantly for lessening his Authority, which hath had the same pernicious Effects among them in proportion, that the Struggles betwixt Prerogative and Property have had among us. 4. That their Constitution is none of the Happiest, for being seven distinct Sovereignties, and not to be concluded by the Majority, it renders them the more liable to be practis'd upon, in order to be divided. 5. That they have a considerable Number of Papists among them, who are always Enemies to a Protestant Government, and are taught by their Priests to Sacrifice the Interest of their Country to that of their Church, of which the King of *France* is now the professed Champion. 6. That being under the same Politick Head with us, they are liable to the Influence of the same destructive Delays or other Impediments, which any ill Party in this Nation is capable of laying in the way of our Councils or Actions. 7. That they are much exhausted, and burden'd with Debt

by the late War, and their People uneasy upon that Account as well as we.

In the next place, let us take a View of our own Condition at home; as to which, it is evident, that we abound with sharp and shameful Divisions, that have a very melancholly Aspect, and such indeed as may make us justly apprehend the Verification of that in our particular Case, which our Saviour said of all such in General, that a Kingdom divided against it self cannot stand. What Native of these Kingdoms can without Grief consider, that the three Nations which make up the British *Empire*, are by an unhappy Management brought to a Disunion among themselves, as to Interest and Affection.

What Englishman is able to command his Passion, who considers the present State of his Country. A Nation divided in the Constituent Parts of its Government, can admit of no Harmony amongst its Subjects, but from the King on the Throne to the Beggar on the Dunghill, every Individual must suffer more or less, by such a Division, yet such is our Misfortune, that we are divided in our Parliaments, divided in our Councils, and this Division runs thro' all the Counties, Cities, Corporations and Societies in the Kingdom, and creates and nourishes unnatural Heats, Jars, and Animosities among People of all Ranks. Is it not strange that such a wise and mighty Nation, who have from time to time so gloriously asserted their Liberties against Foreign and Domestick Usurpations, and have had their *Magna Charta* confirm'd oftner then once, with a Solemnity inferiour to nothing, that ever was transacted upon Earth, but the Promulgation of the Divine Law from Mount *Sinai*. Is it not strange I say, that such a Nation should not yet know the true Boundaries betwixt Prerogative and Property, but that we should be as ready to cut one another Throats, and fall to sides under the foolish Names of *Whig* and *Tory*, as the *Italians* were formerly under

der the like pernicious Distinction of *Guelphs* and *Gibellines*, and as if that Division were not enough, each Branch of it admits of Subdivisions, State Whigs and Church Whigs, State-Tories, and Church-Tories, King *William's* Tories, and King *James's* Tories, Court-Whigs and Country Whigs. There's another Denomination very common among us, which carries the most plausible and generous Aspect of all the rest, and that's an *English Man*, but then it necessarily implies, that there's a Party among us, who are not thought worthy of that Character. We have yet Badges of Division of a more modern Impression, and that is Old Company Men and New Company Men, Old Ministry Men and New Ministry Men, and under Spur Leathers to both, and as if our Hydra had not yet Heads enough, there's new ones still a springing up, there's Addressers and Non-Addressers, and as if we were condemn'd to a Superfatation of Divisions *in infinitum*, no sooner does a new Division spring up, but straight there arises another almost cœvous with it self; for we scarce heard of Addressers, and Non-Addressers, but as soon we heard of those who Addressed for the continuation of the late Parliament, and these were call'd Church of *England* Addressers, and of others who Address'd for calling a new one, and these tho' never so good Churchmen were branded as Fanaticks; some promise to defend the Succession as settled in the *Protestant Line*, and the Church as by Law establish'd, and some Address without any mention either of Church or Succession; some in their Addresses reflect upon the old Ministry, and applaud the Proceedings of the Commons against them, and others in their Addresses inveigh as sharply against the new Ministry, as is obvious to any Man that reads them, so that we are divided in our very Prayers to God and to the King. Some Address against the French King and the pretended Prince of *Wales*, in such a manner as bespeaks their being truly Cordial and Sincere in what they say, and

ſome mention thoſe two Perſons in their Addreſſes like a toothleſs Aſs mumbling Thiftles; or like a Patient ſwallowing a Potion of Phyſick, ſo much againſt their Stomach as infallibly Prognofſticates, that they will vomit it up again, ſome talk of a War, as if their Swords were already brandiſh'd, and their Taxes paid into the Treafury, and others talk of it in ſuch a manner, as ſufficiently declares their Averſion to contribute any thing towards it by Purſe or Perſon; ſome are for aſſiſting our Allies with Foreign Troops hir'd with our Money; ſome are for troubling our ſelves with no Alliances at all, but think we are able to defend our ſelves with our Fleet, and let the reſt of *Europe* take its Fate; ſome are for a ſtanding Force, and ſome are for none at all; ſome are for having all the People of *England*, exercis'd in Arms, becauſe they reckon that they will not readily be falſe to themſelves, and alledge for this the ancient Practiſe of the Nation and the preſent practiſe of our Plantations in the *West-Indies*, by which they have defended themſelves againſt the common Enemy without a ſtanding Force; but others are againſt this, becauſe they think it would be dangerous to the Prerogative, as if that and the Peoples Intereſt ſhould ever thwart one another; ſome are for preſerving the Peace of *Europe*, in ſuch a Senſe as they would have the French King remain undiſturb'd in all his Uſurpations, and ſome are for a War, in order to procure a more ſolid and laſting Peace; ſome are for the Lords, and others for the Commons, and ſome think there were Faults on both ſides, and are for ſtriking a Medium; ſome are for a Monarchy, and others for a Common wealth, and they again crumble into Subdiviſions. Of the Royaliſts, ſome are for a limited, and others for an abſolute Monarchy, and amongſt the Republicans; ſome are for an Ariſtocracy, others for a Democracy, and they are not agreed among themſelves, whether *Holland*, *Venice*, *Swiſſerland*, or *Harrington's Oceana* ſhall be the Model. Nay, our very

very Jacobites are divided among themselves, as appears by the E. of *Melfort's* late Letter ; some were for having the late King brought in by French Arms, (and no doubt its the same with his pretended Son) and others were for having it effected with the Consent of the People ; some of them again are for his giving Liberty of Conscience, and others against it, some of them are for a separate Church of *England* under the Ghostly Conduct of the Nonjurant Bishops and Clergy, others are for complying with the present Church as well as with the present Government, which they own to be such *de facto*, tho' not *de jure*.

Then if we take a View of the State of the Nation as to Religion, we are divided into Protestants and Papists, and the latter as appears by an ingenious and particular Account of it, printed about two Years ago, are more numerous and insolent at present, than they have been perhaps since the beginning of King *Charles 1st's* Reign, when his French Popish Queen shar'd his Throne as well as his Bed. As to the Subdivisions among the Papists, it signifies little to our Subject to take any notice of them, for tho' some of them are so moderate as to think they ought to live quietly under any Government, that secures them in their Property, yet our English Papists being generally Perverts, and by Consequence declar'd Traitors to the English Constitution, it follows naturally that they must be Enemies to a Government, which considers them no otherwise than as Criminal Subjects.

But to return to the Protestants They are divided into Churchmen and Dissenters, and each of these have their Subdivisions. There's King *William's* Churchmen and King *James's* Churchmen, as already mentioned. There's High Churchmen and Moderate Churchmen; the former think Episcopacy of Divine Right, and some of them fly so high, as to say, There's no Salvation without it; the latter think that Episcopacy and Ceremonies are
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only the Product of Ecclesiastical Prudence and Order, and derive their chief Authority from the Statute Book; the former are for bringing all Men to a strict Uniformity by Poenal Laws; the latter are for indulging their fellow Christians, and against a coercive power in Matters Religious. Some of them again are Arminians, and others Calvinists, and a third sort of the middle way. Some of them are for *Passive Obedience* in the Sence it was taught in the late Reigns; some of them are for reconciling that Doctrine with the Principles of the Revolution; some of them are for signing the Articles of the Church as Terms of Peace; others are for subscribing them as the Confession of their own Faith, and the principal Terms of Communion with the Church; some of them are for the Morality of the Sabbath, and others against it, and for a Book of Sports, and of late we have a new Division started among them, pursued with Acrimony and Heat enough, about the Power of the upper and lower Houses of Convocation.

Then as to the Dissenters, they are subdivided into *Presbyterians*, *Independants*, *Quakers* and others; and each of these have their Subdivisions: And as all of them are against the established Church, the Church is likewise against all of them. This weakens our Mutual Confidence in one another, creates Animosities and Jealousies, and makes us far less considerable than otherwise we should be. However, it's our great Happiness that much of the Poyson and Malignity of those multiplied Divisions is taken away since the Revolution, by the laying aside of the *Penal Laws*. Persecution always increases Rancour, and heightens Religious Divisions, and therefore is never practis'd but in such Governments where Tyranny is design'd, and indeed most of those Differences among Ecclesiasticks have been from time to time fomented by Arbitrary Princes, that they might divide their Subjects, in order to set up an Arbitrary Sway; thus they make their Protection
necessary

necessary to all Parties, and grant it to such of them by turns as they find most for their Interest, It follows then by necessary Consequence, that the best way to remove those Divisions is to allow none of the contending Parties any Power over another, and that since Ecclesiasticks are generally too narrow Sould to enlarge their Terms of Communion, the State should do it for them, and not suffer one part of their Subjects to tear to pieces, and to Anathematize another that differs from them in such things as cannot be found plainly express'd in the Text, or naturally deducible from it. It's therefore the Interest of the State to reduce all that is to be injoin'd, for Faith and Practise to the Standard of Revelation, without allowing any humane Impositions for Terms of Communion, and in such things as they differ from one another, they ought to be oblig'd to a Mutual Forbearance. This is the Apostles Rule for the Christian Church; and when Ecclesiastics come to such a Temper of their own accord, or by the Care and Conduct of the Civil Magistrate, then and not till then, are we to expect the return of Primitive Simplicity and true Catholick Christianity, which will make the Lyon lye down with the Lamb, and prevent Religions being made a Firebrand to Civil Contentions, or a Stalking Horse for Ambitious Princes to cover their Arbitrary Designs.

So far we have taken a View of the black side of the Cloud, and would to God we had any just Ground to apprehend that our Skie begins to clear. Of all the Threatning and dangerous Symptomes that are visible upon us, our Parliamentary Divisions look with the most fatal Aspect; when the Head and Intellectuals come once to be affected, 'tis certain the Distemper is risen to a dangerous hight, and that a Crisis is hastening upon us, which will either cure or kill. It's hop'd that by the late Recess and Dissolution, the Causes of former Differences are so much forgotten, as to be no more remembred, or at least so as to
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be laid aside till a more convenient time. We are like to be attack'd by a common Enemy, whose Power grows more formidable every day; let us then have so much common Prudence as to lay aside our Intestine Quarrels, till we be deliver'd from our Foreign Adversary. I remember to have read a remarkable Passage in our own History, that during an Inundation or a Land Flood in *Somerſetſhire*, as I take it, ſeveral Beasts of Prey, and ſuch others, as they naturally prey upon and hunt after, were forc'd to take Sanctuary together in a riſing Ground, and their common Danger did ſo much abate their natural Enmity that they herded together very peaceably. Nothing but a Judicial Infatuation, can hinder Engliſhmen at ſuch a Juncture as this, to have leſs Wiſdom and Conduct than thoſe Engliſh Brutes. It's hop'd that our contending Parties are neither of them ſo fond of Popery and Slavery, as to give the French King an opportunity to entail them upon us while they purſue their Animofities againſt one another. We ought to conſider well, whether thoſe Differences be not fomented among us by his means. The Town hath been ſufficiently ſtunn'd with the noiſe of a meeting betwixt ſome Gentlemen, and one of his Agents, and the Fr. Lewidores have clink'd ſo loud as to be hear'd thro' all *England*. Therefore it concerns us to beware of Heats at home leſt they ſhould bring Fire and Sword upon us from abroad. We have greater Concerns now to mind than, whether the Whiggs or Tories ſhall be uppermoſt in Court or Parliament, nor is it any way proper for us to liſten to thoſe party Allarms, that are ſounded ſo high by virulent Pamphlets on both ſides. If the Deciſion of the Controverſie be referred to the Nation, it's ten to one but they will determine that they have been injured by both, and that the Leaders of the ſeveral Factions have minded their own Credit and Profit more than they have
done

done the Honour and Interest of their Country. It's all one to the good People of *England*, if their Blood and Treasure be lavishly spent, and their Liberty and Property be undermin'd, whether it be done by a Whigg or Tory ; they have both appeal'd to the Publick by their Writings, and the Publick is apt to think they are both to blame, and if the Janglings be further continued to the neglect of the publick Affairs of the Nation, and its Allies, the People will readily be inclin'd to think both of them Criminal.

It's hop'd that the general dissatisfaction which appear'd in the Kingdom at the late unseasonable Heats, and the extravagant Hight they arrived to, may have cool'd some of those Firebrands of Contention, which were unhappily thrown in among us.

The contending Parties may rest satisfied, that the chief *Fruits* they are to expect from their mutual *Quarrels*, will be their *blackning* one another so, as to make both of 'em odious to the World ; when the one falls foul upon the Treaty of Partition, as a Breach of the Grand Alliance, the other replies that supposing it to be as black as they would have it, they can never make it so culpable as suffering the French King to go away with the whole ; and owning the Duke of *Anjou* in his Usurpation. If the one throw Dirt upon the Modern Whiggs ; the other is as zealous to bespatter the old Tories, if the one be charg'd with raising to themselves prodigious Estates, with procuring unlawful Grants, and with concurring to keep up a standing Army ; there are that will tell ye, that the charge is false, or, at least aggravated to the utmost Extent, and that supposing it to be true, the other Party was guilty of all these things in the late Reigns, to much worse purposes, for these Estates, and these Troops were designed for no other end, but to support our present Constitution, whereas those Estates, those Grants, and those Troops were de-

sign'd for the utter Subversion of our Religion and Liberty. It were endless, and to no purpose to go thro' all the Particulars of the Charge, which the Parties have brought against one another, nor can it have any other Effect, but to augment the Flame of Contention, which burns too fiercely already, to need any additional Fuel. The Nation stands in need of Cordials and not of Corrosives, and the only way for both Parties to shew themselves good Patriots, and to recover their Credit with the People, is for the one Party to demonstrate by their future Behaviour, that they are still the Men they formerly profess'd to be, and for the other to demonstrate in like manner, that they are not the Men they were formerly known to be, and thus far we may make bold to say, that the Nation will scarcely look upon the latters pursuing of party Quarrels with so much Partiality, and their creating of Delays in such Measures as ought to be taken against the Common Enemy, to be true marks of a sincere Conversion, no more then they will look upon the Treaty of Partition, Grants, Bribes, Pensions, and standing Armies, &c. charged upon the former to be marks of a steady Perseverance. It's things and not Men and Parties, that we must now have our Eye upon. We ought to be seeking for Expedients of Union, and not to spend our time in raking into the past faults of Persons and Parties, which can have no other Issue, but to heighten our Divisions. We ought to know nothing of Faction in such a Juncture as this, when our Endeavours should be united against the common Enemy, but if nothing less will serve those that seem now to be most intent upon the Design of setting up one Party, and throwing down another, than an absolute Conquest over the Persons and Reputations of those they account their Adversaries. It may be easily foreseen without a Spirit of Prophecy that the Party attackt will make a vigorous Defence, and if no other

Weapons

Weapons, but those of Recrimination will do, it may readily be foretold which of the Parties will look with the blackest Aspect at long-run. There have been and still may be ill Men on both sides, but when the Degrees and nature of the Crimes, and the direct Influence which the respective Principles of the contending Parties may have upon the Faults, that both of them are charg'd with, come to be examin'd and compar'd, 'tis no hard matter to guess on which side the Ballance will turn, and which of the Parties will appear to be most naturally adapted to preserve or destroy the English Constitution. It will therefore be the Wisdom of the Pursuers not to be too eager in the Chase, it has been many times known that a too fierce Assailant, hath lost his Life, by venturing too boldly upon the point of a retiring Defendant: And those that are for the true Interest of *England*, who it's hop'd are by far the most numerous Party, when they see the contending Parties so much taken up in the Defence of their own Interest and Credit, as to neglect those of the Nation, they may be oblig'd to take such Measures as to out them both.

We read of many Prodigies that went before the Destruction of *Jerusalem*, most of them fill'd the Minds of the Spectators with the expectation of some terrible Event, but none of 'em did so naturally Prognosticate the Ruine of that City, as their irreconcilable Factions among themselves, when they were all attackt by the common Enemy. Our Case is much the same, we have a formidable Enemy without, yet are full of Factions within, and the nearer the Enemy approaches, the more fierce is our Party War. If we continue in this Disposition it's easie to foresee the Event.

By this means we must of necessity either be over-run by the Power of the Fr. King, or become a Prey to our own Government, when ever we have the Misfortune to fall under the Conduct of an Ambitious and Aspiring Prince.

It's the natural Genius and Constitution of all such Monarchs to foment Differences on purpose, and to play one Party against another, till they make both of them their Slaves and Vassals, as the French Kings have for many Years done by their miserable Subjects, and therefore its the hight of Folly and Madness for the People of *England*, to suffer themselves to be any further practis'd upon by such unnatural and unreasonable Divisions.

There is this which is something odd in our Case, and perhaps renders the Cure more difficult. The Contending Parties do both of them profess a Cordial Affection to his Majesty's Person, and a mighty Zeal for the English Constitution, and yet are divided into Whiggs and Tories; and under these Denominations, keep up an unnatural Ferment in the Kingdom, so that whatever is propos'd or favour'd by the one, is generally oppos'd and suspected by the other, tho' never so good or rational in its self. Thus we have seen Tories in this Reign contrary to their old Principles act, as Whiggs, and Whiggs in the same manner act like Tories. The Reason is obvious. The Tories by their Principles were Enemies to the Revolution, and therefore being afraid of the present Government, were oblig'd to make use of the Whiggish Principle to lay it under Restraints, and keep it within the Bounds of Law, lest it should totally crush them, this oblig'd them in some things to act the part of good Patriots for their own Safety. On the other hand, the Whiggs laying aside all Jealousie of a Government, founded on a popular Basis, and willing to secure themselves against those who were of the contrary Party, have perhaps concurr'd to allow this Government a greater Liberty in some things, than they would have been willing to allow another that had been their Enemy. and so far they have been in the wrong. It can never be the Interest of a wise People to allow a good Government any more Power than they would

would allow a bad one, because, as *Solomon* tells us, with relation to private Inheritance, *No Man knows whether he that comes after him will be a wise Man or a Fool*. 'Tis as impossible for People in an Hereditary Government to know whether the next Successor will sway *according to Law*, or govern in an *Arbitrary manner*. Whoever is possessed of the Monarchy, will grasp at all the power that hath been allowed their Predecessors, and let them be as bad as *Nero* or *Domitian*, they shall always find a Party in the State that will fall in with their Measures for the sake of Places or Pensions, and the Clergy that they protect in the possession of the Church, and indulge with a Liberty to persecute others, will be sure to preach them up as Sacred and Inviolable, and consecrate them with the Title of God's Vicegerent. There's no Man can call this in Question who will be at the pains to cast his Eye over the Channel, and take a view of the Government of France for these last two hundred Years: Or look back on our own late Reigns.

This Consideration alone might serve to unite our Whiggs and our Tories, would they but allow themselves the use of their Reason. They have both of them felt the weight of opposite Governments, and when that was their respective Lot, they both endeavoured to lay the Government under Restraints, and to keep the Executive Power within the Limits of the Law. This Harmony in Practice ought to unite them in Principle, and to bring them both to consider that they should not allow that against Others, which they would not have done against themselves, and as the Natural Result of this, they ought both to concur in reducing our Government to the Original Standard of all Government, which is a Power to do Good, but to deprive them of all Power of being unjust to their People. And then, and not till then, will our Governors be truly the Vicegerents of God Almighty, who
can:

can do no Injustice to his Creatures that he governs. Our contending Parties have made a considerable advance towards this, in the late Act for settling the Succession, which together with their joint owning of the present Government, unites them both in the Whiggish Principle and destroys the very Notion of Torism, for properly speaking no Tory can submit to the Revolution or agree to the Act of Succession. The Matter being so, it's the most unreasonable thing in the World, that such a Distinction should still obtain amongst those, who submit to King *William*, or are allow'd any Share in the Administration; the Thing by that means being destroy'd there's no Reason to keep up the Name, for there can be no Tory in the proper Sense of the Word, but those who always adher'd to the late King, and do now own his pretended Son.

I know it is objected by some of the Whigs that a strong Party of *de facto* Tories abandon'd the late King, when they saw his Cause desperate, and fell in with the present Government; that those Men have chang'd Masters, but not Principles, and endeavour to get into the Administration, and to recommend themselves to the Government, as more fit to be employ'd for the support of the Monarchy than those of the Revolution Principles. These Men (say they) think that there's a vast Difference betwixt a Government in its Infancy and Maturity, that Princes while their Possession is disputed, or the Success of their Claim uncertain, will for their own Interest fall in with the Party that is most averse to the Governor in Possession, but being once settled, and in no fear of the outed Governor; their Interest leads them to fall in with the Party that continued firm to the last Government, as long as they could with Safety, because 'tis an Argument

gument that they are Persons of most Honour, and of Principles least adapted to control their Monarchs, and therefore more fit to be trusted than those that were for the Revolution. When once such Men can get into the Administration, and that we have the Misfortune of falling under the Government of a weak Prince, they will be for advancing the Perogative as high as ever, in order to ascertain themselves of the Princes Favour, and will break thro' all those Limitations and Restraints, which they concur'd to lay upon a Prince, that they could not bring to fall in with their Measures, and who according to them was only a King *de facto*, which in plain English is no other than an Usurper, and therefore we have not only reason to be suspicious of those Men's Conversion, since at best we can reckon them no other than Tories at large, but we have reason likewise to be jealous of all that they do, and to oppose whatever they attempt towards laying a Restraint on the Prerogative, lest by disobliging the Government we should lose it to that side, and by that means throw our selves unavoidably into all the Calamities of the late Reigns.

To this it may be answered, That though these things are justly enough suspected of some particular Men, it were great want of Charity to charge it upon the whole Party. Many of them may be actually convinc'd by what has been debated in Parliament, and written since the Revolution upon that Subject, and others may be satisfied from their own Observation, that such Principles as they were formerly led into, are inconsistent with the Good of the People, which is the ultimate End of all Magistracy; that for such of them as come into the Government upon Views which are contrary to the

the Interest of *England*, they ought when they discover themselves to be treated as Enemies to their Country: But it will by no means follow, that the best way for the Whiggs to secure themselves against them, is to go over to their old Principles, and to advise or concur with one Government in any thing that may be introductive of Arbitrary Power under another.

It is evident, That the best way to be delivered from such an ill sort of Men as this Objection supposes, is to fall in with them in whatever they propose for the Security of the *People's* Liberty, without enquiring what *Principle* it flows from: For by this Means they will be rendered Uncapable of practising any of those Things that the *O B J E C T I O N* charges them to have in design, but must be taken in their own Snare.

As to that part of the Objection which relates to the disobliging of the present Government, it's the greatest piece of Injustice that can be offered to his Majesty's Character and Conduct; he came to set us at Liberty at first, and by his accepting our Bill of Right then, and his agreeing to the Act of Succession now, he hath clearly manifested to the World, his readiness to grant what may really tend to the Good of the Subject, so that if any thing to the contrary hath happened or shall happen, during his Reign, it must and ought to be charged to the Account of such Apostate Whiggs, and Temporizing Tories, as the Objection represents to us.

There's

There's another thing in which the contending Parties seem to Unite, and that is in resenting the Affront put upon His Majesty and the Nation, by the French King's owning the Pretended Prince of *Wales* as King of *England*, *Scotland* and *Ireland*; and in maintaining the Succession as Established by the late Act. This is a main Point, which the Nation so cordially falls in with, that if the Revolution Party be not deprived of all Judgment and Conduct, it puts them in a Capacity of rooting out Torism for ever.

It has been said already, that none but Tories, properly so call'd, will own, or are in Principle and Affection for that Pretended Prince; and their number, 'tis to be hop'd, is so small, that taking in their elder Brethren the Papists to their Assistance, they are not capable of giving us much trouble. Then as to the *De facto* Men, who are and will be of this or that Side, according as 'tis uppermost; this Juncture affords us the best Opportunity that can be of putting their Principles to the Trial, and of keeping such of them out of all Offices in Church and State, as will not renounce that Pretended Prince and his Heirs and Successors for ever.

There's the same Reason for this, that there was for the Oath of Supremacy and the Sacramental Test. The Design of both these was to prevent the Influence of any Foreign Head, or Jurisdiction upon this Kingdom, because 'twas known that the Papists have all of 'em a dependance upon the See of *Rome*. The Reason holds as strong in this Case, for that Pretended Prince and his Well-wishers must depend upon the Assistance, and be govern'd by the Councils of the French King, which will bring *England* as much under the Subjection of *France*, as is now the *Spanish Netherlands*. For that Pretended Prince, by his suppos'd Father's dying Words, by his Education, and by his Interest, must be obliged to follow the Dictates of the *French Court*. Were our

Sacramental Test chang'd into a Civil one of this Nature, 'twould secure the Nation against the secret Artifices of hidde Enemies, and let into our Assistance those who are known be its Cordial Friends. Many such are now hindered from serving it, upon the Account of a far less difference than that which there must of necessity be betwixt those who are real Friends to our present Constitution, and such as are for the Pretended Prince of *Wales*.

'Tis well enough known that the Sacramental Test was Originally design'd against the Papists, and levell'd directly at their Head, the late King, when Duke of *York*; but by the Artifice of the Court, and the Intemperate Zeal of the Laudean Faction of the Church, was turn'd against the Dissenters. Tho' that was no strange thing then, yet 'tis really surprizing now, that under a Government founded on an English *Basis*, such a Badge of Servitude should be continued upon so numerous a Body of English Protestants. This makes them look like so many Aliens, or rather like People that are Enemies to their Country, and not fit to be trusted, or not able to serve it. 'Twere certainly the Interest of *England* to have this Badge of Division remov'd, that she may not be continually deprived of the Service of so many useful Subjects, that own no dependance upon any Foreign Head or Church, and by Consequence can have no other Interest but that of their Country. This would take off that Imputation from our Legislature, of Prostituting that Sacred Ordinance to a Lucrative and Secular End. If we allow'd our selves freedom of thought, we should quickly be convinced, that as it interferes with our Saviour's Prerogative of Governing his Church, to injoin any other Terms of Christian Communion, than what he himself hath appointed in the Sacred Text; it does likewise interfere with God's Prerogative of Governing the World, to require any other than the Moral Qualifications, which
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he hath appointed for Men in Places of Publick Trust, viz. That they be Men of Ability, fearing God, and hating Covetousness; the deviating from this Rule is the Bane of all Government. 'Tis our own fault that this hurtful and useless distinction is now continued: His Majesty press'd the removal of it, and the Church, who promised, when in danger by the late King. to come to a Temper, has no reason to oppose it; the Dissenting Clergy have a great many other Fences to leap over, before they can come at Ecclesiastical Benefices; and one would think it's Punishment enough, that the Dissenting Laics are doubly Tax'd to the Clergy and Poor, (for it's known that they must contribute to those of the Church, and wholly maintain their own) tho' they be set upon an equal footing with others of the Laity, and made capable of Places of Trust and Profit as well as they. Many of that Party are generally blamed for promising to concur with the late King to take off the Penal Laws; and they are charged with having Countenanc'd his dispensing Power, when he deliver'd them, (who indeed were the only Persons that felt the smart of those Laws) from Prosecution upon that Account. This makes it evidently the Interest of *England*, to free that Party from such Temptations in time to come; for as all Men are Flesh and Blood, it is found by Experience, that Parties of all sorts will fall in with those Measures that free them from Oppression, without considering whether they be strictly warranted by Law. It's known that the Church of *England's* Concurrence with the Prince of *Orange* was against express Statutes, and the celebrated Doctrine of Passive Obedience: Than since all Parties have own'd in their turns, that their own safety is to them the supream Law, and that there are few Men now-a-days so superstitiously addicted to the Observance of the Laws of their Country as *Socrates*, who would rather die, than seem to disobey them by fleeing from

Punishment, tho' they were wrested to his Destruction. It's the Interest of *England* rather to make the Dissenters, who are so considerable a Body of Protestants, more easie, than to lay them under further restraints, as was attempted by some in the last House of Commons. This obliged the first subordinate Magistrate of the Kingdom, who has behav'd himself so in his Post, as to please the best and truest Sons of the Church, to say, That if that Act came to be pass'd in his time, he would lay down his Office; but this must be submitted to our Legislators.

There's nothing can be of greater Concern to this Nation, than to be effectually secur'd against the Claims of the Pretender, his Heirs and Successors; for it is now undeniable, that the *French* King hath not only espous'd his Quarrel himself, but hath entail'd it upon his Son and Grandsons, and all the Princes of the Blood, who promis'd in Publick Council to Engage in it; and have avow'dly own'd him as a Prince of their own Blood, whom they will not abandon. Besides, 'tis very well known that they have another String to their Bow, if this should fail, which is the Pretensions of his supposed Sister; for whose Legitimacy they themselves will become Vouchers, because she was Born in their Country; and by Marrying her to one of their own Princes, they have a very good claim to the Sovereignty over us; so that they don't much question to have us annex'd to their Crown as a Province, one way or other; or if they allow us the Title of a distinct Kingdom, they will take care that we shall be as little able to Controul their Crown, as are the *Normans* and *Britains* at this Day.

The Case being thus, it is our Interest in the first place, to take prudent Measures at Home, for discovering who they are that the *French* rely upon here, and what sort of assurance they have given 'em for supporting

ing the Interest of that Pretender. This is so much the more necessary, because the *French* King has the Confidence to assert every where by His Ministers, that his owning the Prince of *Wales* as King of *Great-Britain*, &c. is no Infraction of the Treaty of *Reswick*. It's true indeed, that by the Fourth Article of that Treaty we seem to have no further Security against the Claims of that Supposititious Prince than during His Majesty's Life ; but it does not follow from thence, that the setting up of his Title before his Majesty's Death is not a Breach of the Treaty, except the *French* King have some other Authority for it than is known to the World. It is our Concern to be at the bottom of his Reasons ; and whatever they be, to secure our selves against them, except we have a Mind tamely to submit our Necks to the Yoke of Popery and Slavery.

In order to this it would seem necessary that we should have either such a Test as that before-mentioned, to secure us against the Pretender's secret Friends, or some other Expedient, such as the united Wisdom of the Nation shall think proper for that End. It's scarcely to be suppos'd that during the Nation's Resentments of the Affront put upon us in this Matter by the *French* King, any of the Impostor's Friends will dare to venture on a publick Opposition to such a Security ; and therefore now is the time to press it.

If it be objected that we are sufficiently secur'd by the Act of Succession. We may readily answer, that if a Door be left open for the Impostor's Friends to worm themselves into the Administration at home, and by that Means to concert Measures with our common Enemy abroad, to bring the Pretender over with an armed Force, either before, or immediately after the King's Death, our Act of Succession won't signify a Farthing ; and that this may be practiced, if due Preventions be not made use of, is plain beyond Contradiction. It's very much talked of, that some Persons of no small Figure could scarcely forbear, when the Duke

Duke of *Gloucester* was alive, openly to speak in Commendation of the Pretender, in Presence of those where common Prudence would have taught them to forbear it, and it has been as much discours'd, that very unbecoming Respects have been paid to him beyond Sea, by those that ought not to have done it. Whether these things be so or not, it's *England's* Concern, that all who are entrusted with our Administration should be clear of Suspicion; and therefore 'twould seem but prudent, that none of those who were evil Counsellors in the late Reigns, or any ways concern'd in the Contrivance or Execution of the Arbitrary Designs that were then carried on, should be intrusted in the Management of publick Affairs, now, (except they have given satisfactory Proofs of their Repentance and Reformation) It may happen otherwise, that we shall be left in the Hands of those very Men that His Majesty came to deliver us from; and if that be the Case, we may easily foresee that our Act of Succession can be no Manner of Security.

The Nation has Reason to insist upon this, and no Ground to doubt of His Majesty's Gracious Compliance with it; because in his Declaration from the *Hague*, when he was gloriously undertaking our Deliverance, he expressly declar'd against those evil Counsellors, *and promised to do all things which the Two Houses of Parliament shall find necessary for the Peace, Honour and Safety of the Nation, so that there may be no more Danger of the Nation's falling at any time hereafter under Arbitrary Government.* And when by the visible Assistance of God he had happily accomplish'd that Work, the Lords and Commons, in their Declaration of Rights and Liberties did concur with His Majesty in his Charge against those evil Counsellors *as having endeavoured to subvert the Protestant Religion, and the Laws and Liberties of the Kingdom.* So that if we should be in the Hands of such Administrators at the time of His Majesty's Death, 'twould be such an Indelible Evidence of our apostatizing

tizing and unsteady Temper, as no time will be able to vindicate us from.

Another thing that seems necessary for our Security, is a League for making our Act of Succession effectual. The Necessity of this appears plain from the Consideration of the Power of *France*, which espouses the Cause of the Pretender. It will readily be granted, that if we be left to our selves, *France*, and our own Malecontents, may give us a great deal of Trouble; and therefore such an Alliance would be very convenient. The House of *Hanover* is not capable of doing much by its self, because it has no Naval Force, yet their Interest in the Empire to give *France* a Diversion that way, and their Influence upon the Northern Crowns, and the States of *Holland*, may be of Use to us: The latter indeed are the only People capable of doing us the greatest Service, because of their Nearness and mighty Power both by Sea and Land. We have no Reason to doubt but His Majesty's Influence, and their own Interest, will readily bring them into such an Alliance. For the Reason which induc'd them to assist the Prince of *Orange* to rescue us from Popery and Slavery, is as strong, or stronger, in the present Case; and that Reason, as they then declar'd it to all the Foreign Ministers residing at the *Hague*, was, *That if King James, being in a strict Alliance with the French King, should obtain an Arbitrary Power over his People, those two Kings would then endeavour to ruin Holland as well as England, out of Interest of State, and Hatred to the Protestant Religion.*

In the next place, we ought not to neglect our Neighbours of *Scotland*. Their falling in with us as to the Succession, shuts a Back-Door, that may otherwise open a Way to the Ruin of all the three Nations; Should our common Enemy be able to work upon the Resentments of that Nation, for the Treatment they have complain'd of, as to *Darien*, and other Matters, and bring them into an Humour to accept the Pretender; and at the same time, should

Should he invade us in the *South*, whilst they annoy us in the *North*, the Consequences might be much worse than we imagine. We have it in our Power to prevent all that is to be feared from thence, by doing them the Justice that is due to Fellow-Subjects, and suffering them to act so for themselves, as they may rather be an Help than a Burden to us. It's well enough known with what Contempt that Nation has been treated in publick Assemblies by some persons; but such indeed as are distinguished by nothing but what makes them stink in the Nostrils of our own People at home; and therefore their Sentiments are not to be much regarded, with Relation to our Neighbours abroad. There are others that talk of bribing some few of them with Money; and that the Interest of those that are so brib'd will easily bring over the rest; but these Gentlemen don't consider that *Louis XIV.* is too old a Practitioner in that Art to be outdone in it by new Upstarts; and that Men of vendible Souls are always to be purchas'd by the highest Bidder. Besides, as that Practice is dishonourable, it is but very seldome that it proves effectual? for it's only a few Men, and not the whole Nation, that can be brib'd; and when such Designs upon a People come once to be discovered, or are but violently suspected, they are so far from appeasing'em, that they do but more and more enrage them, as was evident from the Proceedings in their last Session of Parliament; which notwithstanding all endeavours to keep them silent, as to *Darien*, did zealously assert their Title to that Colony, and did more towards recovering the ancient Liberty of their Country than any Parliament since the Restoration.

The only way then to obviate all Dangers from that side, is either to come to such an Union with them as may make their Interest ours in all Respects; or to suffer them, without Molestation, to settle their Succession as we have done ours, with such Limitations as they shall think most conducive for securing their Religion and Liberty.

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By this means we infallibly oblige the whole Nation, which is a much better way to ascertain their Friendship, than by engaging a Ministry of this or that Faction, who are in Favour to Day, and in Disgrace to Morrow, according to the Humour that governs at Court.

It remains still, that we ought to have a very great regard to *Ireland*; that unhappy Nation, hath oftener than once put this Kingdom to a great expence of Blood and Treasure: The Cause was visibly in the mismanagement of the late Reigns, and the Influence of their Instruments, since we have been blest'd with this. 'Twill be very unhappy for *England*, if that Country should once more become the Seat of a Rebellion, and a Receptacle for *French* Troops. Those of the North of that Kingdom, and elsewhere, who were so prodigal of their Lives and Fortunes to support this Government, seem, by what unhappy management God knows, not to be so well satisfied with their Compensation, as to give us any ground to expect that they will Act with the like Zeal, in Case of a new War there. 'Tis therefore highly Incumbent upon this Nation, to endeavour to remove as much as possible all Causes of discontent from the Protestants of *Ireland*, and seriously to endeavour the Conversion of the Papist there, tho' we should be at the charge of a proper Mission for that End; but without any thing of Dragooning or Penal Laws; these are Methods fit for the *Pope* or *Mahomet*, but no way suited to the meek and lowly Spirit of the Christian Religion. Much more might have been said with reference to those two Nations, would our design'd Brevity have allowed it. But thus much may be advanc'd in short, That it would be the Advantage of *England*, to have both of 'em so link'd to us in Interest and Affection, that it might not be in the Power of Foreign or Domestick Potentates to make them Back-doors for an In-

vation, or Instruments of setting up an Arbitrary Government, as hath been several times attempted since the Reign of King *James I.*

We are no less concerned to take care of our *West-India* Plantations, which are now in more danger than ever, having the Power of *France* and *Spain* United against them. It may be of fatal Consequence, if any Mercenary Spirits, Tools of the late Reigns, or such as are displeasing to the People of those Parts, be entrusted with Eminent Posts in the Government there. We ought to be particularly careful to support 'em with a good Naval Force, and to use our Endeavours to extinguish all Heats and Divisions among the Inhabitants, lest the common Enemy improve it to the disadvantage of *England*. There's one thing hath happened in those Parts lately, which would seem to have been set on Foot by the common Enemies of our Peace, to divide us; and that is, that several *Scotch* Gentlemen, Clergymen, and others of that Nation, have been Opprobriously treated, and turned out of their Posts, and all of that Country declared incapable of bearing any Office in those Plantations; tho' they assisted with as much Zeal as any other of the Inhabitants, in the Defence of the said Countries against the *French* during the last War; this is so much the more observable, that those Proceedings thwart a late Determination of His Majesty and the Privy Council to the contrary, and are directly against that which hath been look'd upon as a rul'd Case, ever since the famous Debate about the *Post nati*, in the Reign of King *James I.*—This deserves a more speedy Application, lest it should add to those grounds of discontent, which our Neighbours of *Scotland* are of late become so full of, and perhaps may lose us the Assistance of our Friends, when we have most need of them.

The next, and indeed the main thing to be done for our security, is to bring *France* to such a Condition, that she shall not be able either to Impose that Pretender upon

on us, or to Support or Encourage any of our future Princes in their Arbitrary Designs against us, as she did *Charles II. and James II.*

There's no prospect of doing this without a War, and such an one too, as must be Prosecuted with Vigour.

Here I find my self encountred at first setting out, by a late Pamphlet, Entituled, *Reasons against a War with France: Or, An Argument shewing that the French King's owning the Prince of Wales, as King of England, Scotland and Ireland, is no sufficient Ground for a War.*

The Author is at some Pains to perswade the World that he is no Jacobite; nor shall I endeavour to fix that reproach upon him; it is no way material to the Subject in Hand; but his Argument looks much like it at first View, especially considering that it is the Topick of all our Jacobites; and that the first time he mentions his Prince of *Wales*, which is in his Title Page, he does it without the Epithet of *Supposititious or Pretended*, which all but those of his Party have constantly branded him with. I must however do our Author this Justice, as to say, that in other places he Argues too much like an Englishman, to be in the Pretender's Interest; and therefore this, and other things of that Nature, I shall look upon to be meer Oversight.

The only thing that I think my self oblig'd to confute in our Author, is, *That the French King's owning the Prince of Wales, as King of England, &c. is no sufficient ground of a War; and that his doing so is not directly contrary to the Stipulations of the Treaty of Reswick.*

To begin with the latter, our Author equivocates upon the Word *directly*, which might do well enough among Boys of the lower Forms at Schools, but can never take among Men of Reason. There's no direct Provision in that Treaty, that the *French King* shall not In-vade *Ireland, Scotland, Virginia, Barbadoes, &c.* But it is fully included in the Second Article, under the general Terms of Kingdoms, Territories, Dominions, and
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Places; and therefore if he should Invade any Place belonging to the King of *Great Britain*, tho' not directly mentioned in the Article, the World would conclude him to be guilty of a direct Breach of the Treaty.

The present Case is yet stronger against our Author, for by the fourth Article of the Treaty of *Reswick*, the *French King* is expressly bound up from giving or affording any Assistance Directly or Indirectly, to any Enemy or Enemies of the said King of *Great Britain*, so that his Cavil upon the Word *Directly*, can do the *French King* no manner of Service. —Our Author's Explanation of the Word *Assistance*, that it means nothing but Arms, Ammunition, Ships, Provisions or Money, is likewise contrary to the plain Letter of the Treaty; which after having enumerated those Methods of Assistance that our Author takes notice of, adds in the very next Words, *Or in any other Way*; but this he thinks fit to pass over in his Argument, tho' he repeats those very Words in his Quotation of the Article, p. 6. There is yet another Clause in the Fourth Article not taken notice of by our Author, which bears hard upon the *French King's* owning that Pretender, viz. That he will in no Manner whatsoever favour the Conspiracies or Plots, which any Rebels or Ill-disposed Persons may in any Place Excite or Contrive against the said King. And that he will not assist with Arms, &c. or any other Way, any Person or Persons, who shall hereafter under any Pretence whatsoever, Disturb or Molest the said King of *Great Britain* in the free and full Possession of his Kingdom, &c.

Now if we can but prove, that the *French King's* owning the pretended Prince of *Wales* is in any way an Assistance to the Enemy or Enemies of the King of *Great Britain*, or that it is in any manner a favouring of Conspiracies or Plots, which Rebels or ill-disposed Persons may in any Place Excite or Contrive against the said King, then our Author must agree, that it is a Breach of the Treaty, and by Consequence a good Cause of War.

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To prove that 'tis *in some way an Assistance*, we have the joint Testimony of the Jacobites on both sides the Sea. When the *French King* came to pay this Pretender a Visit, and expressed himself thus, *Voila un Prince que j'ay toujours cheri, & un Roy que j'aimeray a Jamais*; i. e. There's a Prince whom I have always cherish'd, and a King that I shall always love; and speaking at the same time to the Court of *St. Germain's*, said, *Messieurs voila votre Roy*; i. e. Gentlemen, there's your King. This was look'd upon by our Jacobites in *France* to be such an effectual and considerable Assistance, that it immediately converted their Tears and Sighs for the loss of the late King into Transports of Joy, that his most Christian Majesty had own'd their new King. As a further Proof of what I say, there was publish'd here some time ago by our Jacobites an Account, by way of Letter, of the late King *James's* Sickness and Death, and of his Behaviour on his Death-bed. This Letter informs us, That the Matter of owning the Pretender as King of *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, was debated publickly in Council, and that most of the Privy Counsellors were for delaying it; upon which the Dauphin rose up in Heat, and with a great deal of Warmth pressed the owning of him; alledging that they could do no less, he being a Prince of their own Blood, &c. and to this the *French King*, and all the other Princes of the Blood, agreed. By all which it appears, That the owning of the Pretender was not a meer Complement, or the giving him *an empty Title to please him, as our Author words it*, p. 7. but a thing concerted with Deliberation, and in view of its being resented by the King of *Great Britain* and his Subjects, why else should the *French King's* Privy Council have been for delaying it? To this we may add, the Duke of *Anjou's* Return to the Pretender's Complement, when he congratulated his Accession to the Crown of *Spain*, viz. *That he hoped e're long to have an Opportunity to congratulate him upon the like Occasion*; and told him,

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That in that Case he might depend upon his Friendship and Assistance. It is self-evident, That this Answer was put into the Mouth of the Youngster, and was justly look'd upon by some then to be a Prognostic of what hath since come to pass. We have heard what were the Sentiments of our Jacobites in *France* of all this; and no Man can be so much a Stranger to the Conversation of that Party in *England*, as not to know that how Crest-faln soever they appeared before, this gave their Looks a new Air, and fill'd them with fresh Hopes, which swell'd them so big, that they could not contain themselves; they expressed their Confidence with so much *Imprudence*, (to give it no worse Name) on all Occasions, that no other Government but this would have suffer'd 'em to pass unpunish'd. Thus it appears, That we have the Testimony of both our *French* and *English* Jacobites, that the *French* King's owning their pretended Prince is in *some way an Assistance*.

In the next Place it is plain, That since the *French* King hath own'd the Justice of his Title, there's nothing else by the Fourth Article of the Treaty of *Reswick* that stands in the way of his endeavouring to put him in Possession; but King *William's* Life, which is one of the *greatest Excitements that can be for our Jacobite Assassins to go on to form Plots* against His Majesty's Life, as they have already attempted oftner than once; by which it appears that the *French* King's owning that Pretender is a direct Breach of the Treaty; and if we may be allow'd to say so, His Majesty's agreeing to the Treaty of *Reswick* to save the Blood and Treasure of his Subjects, without a further Security for his own Life, was an unaccountable Piece of Condescension; had the Consent of his People been formally requir'd to it, they could not without a Crime have acquiesc'd in a Treaty for their own present Ease, which did so much expose His Majesty's Life, and the Peace of Posterity; it is therefore to be hop'd, That whenever Affairs are again brought to be determin'd by a Treaty,

Treaty, there will be more Care taken in this Matter.

But further, the *French King's* owing the Pretender is contrary to the first Article of the Treaty of *Reswick*, which provides, 'That there shall be a perpetual Peace, and a true and sincere Friendship between the two Kings, their Heirs and Successors, and between the Kingdoms, States and Subjects of both; and the same be so sincerely and inviolably observ'd and kept, that the one shall promote the Interest, Honour and Advantage of the other, that on both sides a faithful Neighbourhood, and true Observation of Peace and Friendship may daily flourish and increase.

There is not one Clause or Sentence of this Article that the *French King's* owning the Pretender does not violate. Is that the Way to preserve Peace and true Friendship with his Majesty and his Successors, to countenance one to usurp his Title during his own Life, and to exclude the Protestant Successors, which upon his Majesty's Recommendation, the Nation hath agreed to in Parliament. Surely the *French King* can never have the Confidence, so much as to alledge, That either the King or the People agreed to have that Pretender to be his Successor; and without the Consent of both, 'tis impossible to clear him from the Guilt of breaking this Article, by owning that Impostor. Is it possible that this can be the Way to maintain Peace and Friendship betwixt *France* and *England*, for *Lewis XIV.* not only to own that Pretender himself, but to engage all his own Sons, and the other Princes of the Blood, to espouse his Quarrel as our King, when he knows that this Nation does generally look upon that Person as suppositious; that they dethron'd his supposed Father, because of his being in the Interest of *France*, and engag'd in a Design to overturn our Religion and Liberties; and that they must needs have an utter Abhorrence of the Pretender, were he his real Son, because educated in the Maxims and Religion of *France*, which
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are inconsistent with those of *England*; and in the last place, when he knew that the Kingdom of *England* had settled the Succession otherwise. Can any Man of Sense imagine that this is the Way to promote the Honour, Interest and Advantage of *England*, or to occasion the flourishing and Encrease of Friendship, as he is obliged to by the first Article of the Treaty.

His Breach of the Treaty in this Manner is so much the more unreasonable, because 'tis strongly presum'd, That he was let into the Secret of the Counterfeit Pregnancy. Mr. *J. W—r* looks upon himself to have been the first Projector of putting the late King upon that and the other Methods, which accelerated the happy Abdication that did his Country so much Service.

We might otherwise have still been languishing under a Consumption in our Vitals, whereas this Project brought it to an acute Disease, which by the Strength of the *English* Constitution and Genius we happily overcame. *W—r* is positive in this, and keeps by him the original Draught, which we communicated to the late Sir *J. Guise*, and he imparted it to a great Man, who hath been blamed by some, and commanded by others, for putting the late King upon the Practice of the Scheme, that was originally Mr. *W—r's*, tho' others have reap'd the Advantage of it, as is usual in all such Cases.

I suppose by this time it is evident enough, That the *French* King's owning the Pretender as King of *England* is a Breach of the Treaty of *Reswick*; not only according to the Letter, but according to the Spirit, as *Lewis XIV.* hath of late taught the World to distinguish; and with this Opinion the Nation unanimously falls in, as appears by their Addresses, and think it a very good Cause of War.

And indeed, had there been no such Treaty to obviate the *French* King's Insolence in that Matter, his doing it in Opposition to the Authority of the King and Parliament of *England*, were Cause enough for a War. Who constituted

stituted him Arbiter and Judge of our Succession, or gave him Power to take upon him to determine that a Person whom our present King, and the Bulk of the Nation, have branded as an Impostor, is really legitimate? Who impowered him to offer at imposing a King upon us, who, tho' there were no question as to his Birth, is excluded by Act of Parliament, by reason of his Moral Incapacity, as being a Nursling of Tyranny and Popery? Can any Man, who has a Drop of *English* Blood in his Veins, bear with the Insolence of this haughty *Nimrod*? Shall he, whose own Legitimacy was question'd by the first Princes of the Blood of *France*, because of *Louis XIII's* known Frigidity, impose a spurious Prince upon the Kingdom of *England*? Does he not know that our Royal Line has a better Right to the Crown he wears than he has himself, tho' *Richlieu* and *M. le Grand* had never been taken in to assist *Louis XIII. in Omnibus suis Negotiis*, as the Cardinal worded it himself? Certainly such an Affront as this upon the *English* Nation, and not only personal upon the King, as our Author seems to insinuate, Page 5. ought to raise their Courage and Resentments to the same Pitch with that of their Ancestors; who chastis'd the Insolence of the *French* in the Battels of *Agencourt* and *Verneuil*, &c. Nothing less than the Revenge of *Tomyris*, when she cut off *Cyrus* his Head, and threw it into a Vessel full of Blood, bidding him take now a full Draught of that which he had always thirsted after, can be a just Satisfaction to the People of *England*. *Louis* hath by this Practice arraigned the Sovereignty of our Nation, as if we had not a Right to settle our own Succession according as we judge it may best secure our Religion and Liberties. It's therefore our Interest to make War upon him in such an effectual Manner, as to render him and his Successors incapable of restoring us and the rest of *Europe* for the future.

It's in vain to alledge, that we may be secured by Treaties without a War, or the *French* King's surrendering

all that he hath usurp'd in the Name of his Grandson the Duke of *Anjou*. We find that Treaties now-a-days are nothing but Snares and Amusements to gain time, and that *Lonis XIV.* hath made it his constant Practice to impose upon his Neighbours by Treaties, and to render them secure, that he might rob them of their Dominions, under the Covert of some fraudulent Quibble or other upon those Treaties. This is evident from the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, to this very Day. Besides, we find that he has infallible Methods to break all Alliances that are made against him. Thus he broke the Tripple Alliance made betwixt *England*, *Sweden* and *Holland*, to stop the Progress of his Arms. In like manner he broke that of *Nimeguen*; nor is any Man ignorant that he found out Methods to break the late grand Alliance, and to bring the most considerable of its Members into the Treaty of Partition, which as also the Treaty of *Reswick* he hath broke in a most gross and scandalous Manner. From all which 'tis evident that there's no way to secure our selves against his Attempts, but by reducing him to such a Condition as he shall not be able to annoy us.

The Matter being thus, the next thing to be considered is, how a War must be manag'd, so as to be carried on with a Probability of speedy Success. In order to this 'twould seem necessary in the first place, that the Command of our Fleets and Armies should be put into the Hands of such Men as are known to be intirely in the Interest of the Government; not meerly because of the profitable Posts that they enjoy under it, but because of the Principles upon which 'tis founded. 2. That they be such as have an Interest in the Nation, and in the Affections of the People; this will in great Measure secure them from those Suspicions, that Men of low or desperate Fortunes, or who were the Instruments of Oppression, or Tools in the former Reigns, will always be liable to. 3. That the Soldiers and Seamen be du'y paid, and kindly treated.

This

This will make their Families and Relations easie at home, and encourage themselves to venture their Lives with Chearfulness abroad. The People will bear their Taxes without grumbling, when they find the Money levied for their Defence, faithfully applied to that, and no other end; 'twill prevent the Clamours that have been rais'd and publish'd against most of our publick Offices, and take away that Handle which some ill Men did of late improve to a very dangerous height against the Administration.

4. That all those who are entrusted as Lords of the Admiralty, Commissioners of the Navy, Commissioners for the Sick and Wounded, Commissioners of the Victualling-Office, Prize-Office, &c. be Persons of known and sufficient Abilities for the Discharge of their respective Trusts; that they be Men of undoubted Loyalty to the Government, and firm to the Interest of their Country; such as have been more remarkable for their Sufferings, or Opposition to the ill Administration of the late Reigns, than for their fawning upon the Government in this. That such as are advanc'd to these important Posts take care to employ none in the subordinate Charges under them, but Men of Integrity; that will not oppress or defraud those that have Occasion to apply to them, and that the chief Commissioners make due Enquiry from time to time into the Administration of their inferiour Officers; that they may neither defraud the Publick themselves, or countenance it in others, as has been too frequently, and perhaps too justly, complain'd of hitherto. In order to this, 'twill be highly necessary that the chief Commissioners of these respective Offices be ready to encourage and protect all such as shall discover any Fraud and Oppression that properly belongs to their Cognizance; and that as they are not to suffer their subordinate Officers to be vexed by frivolous or unjust Accusations on the one Hand, they should take care that Prosecutors and Witnesses be not baffled, oppress'd and discourag'd on the

other. Proceedings of this Nature have been compain'd of in the Case of several People that were formerly ruin'd for discovering Embezzlements in His Majesty's Naval Stores, &c. And if the like Practices be still continued, it must of Necessity be ruinous to the Nation. 'Twas one of the greatest Temporal Blessings that ever God Almighty promis'd to his People, *to make their Officers Peace, and their Exacters Righteousness.* And when he leaves a Nation so far to themselves, as to suffer the contrary Practice, 'tis an infallible Sign of approaching Ruin.

The best Method to prevent such Dangers would seem to be, that the Representatives of the Nation should be consulted in such a dangerous Juncture as this; what Persons are fit to be employed in the Places of greatest Power and Trust. 'Twas never reckon'd any Diminution to the Prerogative of the *English* Crown for our Princes to ask and take the Advice of their Privy-Council in the Disposal of such Offices; much less ought it to be accounted such, when they take the Advice of the great Council of the Nation. On the contrary, it must needs be a great Ease to the Throne, a sure Way to prevent His Majesty's being impos'd upon, and the best Defence against all those Calumnies which the Enemies of the Government are ready to improve, for blackening the Administration; for in this Case, if the Parliament should advise to ill Men, (as it is scarcely probable they will) the Crown would be blameless; and in case of real ill Management or false Accusations, the punishing of the one, and the acquitting of the other, being submitted to the Cognizance of the Parliament, 'twould remove all that Odium from the Throne, which generally attends such Cases.

So much for the Employment and Treatment of the Men that must be employ'd in, and about the Management of the War; of which, after all that can be said, they are the chief and principal Sinew.

The next thing to be considered is the Management of the
Publick

Publick Money, which is the other great Sinew of War: In a mix'd Government, like ours, where the People have the sole Power of the Purse, 'twould seem to thwart the very Nature of our Constitution, to exclude them from a share in the management of it; and therefore His Majesty hath always readily agreed to their appointing Commissioners to inspect the Publick Accounts; might it not then be proper in our present Circumstances, when so great a noise has been made in the World, about Mens raising vast Estates to themselves out of the Publick Money, that the Parliament should be consulted in the Nomination and Appointment of those that are to have the Charge of paying our Armies and Fleets. This would remove the Handle which ill Men take of defaming Governments, as advancing their Favourites and Servants to enrich themselves with the Money that is given for the defence of the Country, whilst Fleets and Armies remain unpaid; and on the other Hand, 'twould in a great measure allay those Jealousies, which People have been so ready to entertain, that an Army may at some time or other be employed to bereave the Nation of its Liberties.

It is likewise highly necessary for bringing the War to a good and speedy Issue, that our Councils and Administration be steady, that the Interest of all Parties should truckle to that of the Nation, that those who are in Chief Trust about His Majesty be such as are most beloved and trusted by the Country, and have always been true to the Principles of the Revolution: Experience hath shew'd us, that the People of *England* will ever be Jealous and Uneasie, when they see Men of Arbitrary Principles, that were voted for concurring with such an Administration in the late Reigns, prefer'd to high Posts in this. The wisest of Kings hath laid this down as a never-failing Maxim, *Take away the Wicked from before the King, and his Throne shall be established in Righteousness,*

teousness. * And he gives it as the Character of a Wise King, *That he scatters the Wicked, and brings the Wheel over them ; that his Favour is toward a wise Servant, but his Wrath against him that causeth Shame,* and for not following those Sage Councils, but acting by the Advice of *Young Hot-headed Advancers of the Prerogative,* or in the English Dialect, *buffing Tories,* his own Son *Rehoboam* lost Ten Parts in Twelve of his Dominions. His Majesty has been graciously pleased in his Proclamation of *Feb. 24. 1697.* against Prophaneness and Immorality, to promise that he would particularly punish it, *in such who are employ'd near His Royal Person,* and therefore we have Reason to believe that he will be careful to employ such Persons about him, as may set the Nation a good Example by their Piety and good Morals, and not such as may cause Shame ; and that he will carefully avoid the Employment of such Persons, when they are made known to him, as by their wicked Principles would overturn our Constitution, and turn a regular Monarchy into a lawless Tyranny. This is an Immorality of far greater Consequence than those common Disorders of Life, which make Men odious to one another, but both of 'em are justly hateful. The Observation of these Rules is the more Incumbent upon our present Court, because the neglect of them by former Courts has been visibly Punish'd by the Hand of God, who literally fulfilled upon them that which he threatned against the *Israelites* and their King, if they acted contrary to his Laws, *viz. That they should be brought to a Nation, which neither they nor their Fathers had known, where they should serve Gods of Wood and Stone.* † This was so exactly accomplish'd in the Persons of our two late Kings, and many of their Followers, that every Man who does not wilfully shut his Eyes against the Evidence of Truth, must observe it ; and by the account we had of the late King's
Sickness

* Prov. Cap. 25. 5. Cap. 20. 26. Cap. 14. 15. † Deut. 28. 36.

Sickness and Death, in a Letter Printed and Published here by his own Friends, the reading of these Words in his Chappel, *Remember, O Lord, what is to come upon us: Consider and behold our Reproach. Our Inheritance is turned to Strangers, our Houses to Aliens.* * sunk his Spirits so much, that he never recovered it; then since it is evident, that his employing and listening to such Servants, as advis'd him to overturn our Constitution, was the immediate Cause of his Reproach and Disgrace; it ought to serve as a Beacon to all our future Rulers, to beware of those dangerous Shelves. To this we may add, that as the Employment of such Persons increases Fears among the People at Home, it makes us seem little to our Allies Abroad. This was the Reason, that in the late Reigns we were branded by Forreigners with such a Fluctuation and Unsteadiness of Councils, as we could not be depended on for two Years together; and therefore if the same sort of Persons be employed, or the same Measures pursued; it naturally follows, that they will still have the same opinion of us. The Consequence of which must be, that they will make the best Terms they can with the *French Nimrod*, and this will bring all *Europe* under his Chains.

In the next place, it is incumbent upon all such as are or shall be taken into the Administration, to shun those Faults, with which the new and old Ministry do charge one another.

'Twill be a very good Improvement of our late extravagant Heats, if our Ministers of State, Privy Counsellors, and other Courtiers, be thereby taught to avoid such Errors and Faults. Those that are plac'd in high and eminent Stations, ought to have more than an ordinary share of Virtue; for we see that small Faults, or perhaps Suspicion without any Fault at all, is apt to be magnified against such, into Crimes of the highest Nature. From all which it is evident, that Ministers of State, and Privy Coun-

* Lam. 5. 1, 2.

Counsellors in *England*, ought not only to be so honest, as not to concur with those that give ill advice to their Prince, but likewise to have so much Fortitude and Self-denial, as to quit any Post whatever in the Prince's Service, rather than be oblig'd to concur in any thing that may be to the dishonour and disadvantage of the Crown or Country. It's a known Maxim, *That the King of England can do no wrong*, and it perfectly agrees with the Definition of a King, that we have in the sacred Text. *St. Paul* tells us positively, that *Rulers are not a Terror to Good Works, but to the Evil, and that they are Ministers of God for Good*, &c. * From which it naturally follows, that Ministers of State, and others, are under no Obligation to put the unjust Commands of Princes in Execution; for the Nature of the Government, with which they are entrusted, gives them no Power to Command any such thing; and if there were none to put them in Execution, there would be no occasion for Passive Obedience, as taught in the late Reigns; for it's absurd to imagine that Princes could in their own Persons be Judges, Juries, and Executioners; from whence it is evident, that that unreasonable Doctrine and Tyranny do mutually bring forth one another, and become Mother and Daughter by turns, as the old Riddle says of Ice and Water. 'Twere to be wish'd that all Courtiers, and particularly those of *England*, would consider this; there can be no better way for the latter to vindicate themselves from that Reproach which some Forreign Authors take the liberty to charge them with.

What Englishman can, (without having all the Blood in his Veins ready to boil over) read what *John de Witt* says of English Courtiers, in his Book of the *fundamental Maxims and Politicks of Holland*, viz. *That they are the most lavish and thievish of any Courtiers in the World*; and speaking of the late King *Charles II.* he says, *That he consum'd all the strength of the Island upon his Luxury and Favourites.*

What

* Rom. 14:

* What he means by our Courtiers being Thievish, is, *That during a War by Sea or Land, they do so misapply and waste the Publick Money, that it always falls short.* As there's no Englishman that can read this unworthy Reflection without being sensibly touch'd, it's certainly the Duty of our English Courtiers to behave themselves so, as his Countrymen that are here may see his Reflection falsified; and it ought to make our *Dutch* Courtiers particularly Cautious, that there be nothing in their practice which may confirm their Countryman's Maxim, or bring it in Judgment against them.

The next thing required towards a speedy and happy Issue of the War, is that the approaching Parliament be Unanimous, Vigorous, and Speedy in their Resolves. The Nation being dissatisfied in general, that the late House of Commons was obstructed in their vigorous Proceedings against *France*, by those well known and unhappy Debates which fell in among them; His Majesty out of His Fatherly Care hath prudently dissolved that Parliament; it is certainly the readiest and most natural way to end a Quarrel to separate the contending Parties, which was highly necessary at a time when we are all in hazard of being swallowed up by the Common Enemy. Then since the King hath graciously done his part, it's now incumbent upon the Nation to act theirs, in chusing such Men as will readily concur in what they would have had the late House of Commons do. If the Nation take due Care in this Matter, it will be truly unaccountable if we should have the misfortune of a Parliament that will neglect the Safety of the Kingdom, and indeed of all *Europe*, in this extream danger, to pursue private Piques and party Quarrels; 'it hath been urged in Pamphlets and 'Discourses, that tho' the Lords, against whom Articles 'have been Exhibited, be as guilty as their Enemies

* Aanwysing der heilsame politike Gronden & Maximen van de Republike van *Holland*. p. 297. &c.

'would have them to seem, yet the Treaty of Partition
 'being now out of Doors, and their Accession to it, for
 'ought that yet appears, no more than hearing of it, and ad-
 'vising against it, (except it be that the Lord *Sommers* put
 'the great Seal to it, &c. by His Majesties Command) it
 'would seem to be the Interest of *England* at this time,
 'that a general Act of Indemnity should rather be urg'd
 'to unite us against the Common Enemy, than to give any
 'occasion for further Divisions, by Endeavours to make
 'great Men Criminals for such things as they either ad-
 'vis'd against, or can offer to defend by the Laws and
 'Customs of the Country, and especially when those at
 'the bottom of the Prosecution are so visibly partial, as to
 'suffer others, who are more concerned in those Matters,
 'to escape without being touch'd.

When we are struggling against the greatest Forreign
 Tyrant that ever assum'd the Christian Name, it will be
 a terrible misfortune to be depriv'd of the Assistance
 and Direction of the Parliament, by reason of Debates
 betwixt the two Houses, and Party Quarrels in each
 House: At the same time, there's no doubt but some
 People will take it as a Handle to Libel and Calumni-
 ate one or both, as has been done in some late Pam-
 phlets, which take the Liberty to say, 'That the Peo-
 'ple were not allowed to represent their Grievances and
 'apparent Dangers to those whom they empower'd to
 'take care of having them redress'd and prevented; and
 'that if such a part of our Constitution, as has al-
 'ways been look'd upon to be the strongest Barrier a-
 'gainst the Arbitrary Power of our Princes, should be-
 'come so Arbitrary themselves, as to Imprison the Sub-
 'ject for humbly Petitioning, to commit Men without
 'unquestionable Authority, without a previous Examina-
 'tion, and without any prospect of their being set at
 'Liberty by due Course of Law; and in a Word, to be
 'so Arbitrary in their Proceedings, as to think them-
 'selves

‘ selves no ways accountable to the People that depute
 ‘ them. If this be our Case, it’s in vain for us to struggle
 ‘ against a Forreign Tyranny, when we are oppress’d by one
 ‘ that’s Domestick.

‘ But if to all this there be added this unhappy Circum-
 ‘ stance, that the Persons accus’d are known to be intirely
 ‘ in the Interest of the Government, and that the principal
 ‘ Fomenters of those Divisions, are suspected to be in the
 ‘ Interest of our common Enemy, or such as have refus’d to
 ‘ give that voluntary Testimony of their Affection to the
 ‘ present Government; that most of the Subjects have
 ‘ cheerfully done, or such as have formerly lain under the
 ‘ just Odium of the Nation, for mis-applying the publick
 ‘ Money, and having been Abettors of Arbitrary Courses;
 ‘ and that those very Men and their Adherents are possess’d
 ‘ of part of the Administration, and eagerly pursuing after
 ‘ the whole, then indeed our Case seems to be next door to
 ‘ what we call desperate.

It is too well known that several Pamphlets, in Words
 to that or the like Effect, alledge all these things just now
 mentioned, to have been our late Circumstances; and
 therefore ’twill be our own Fault if they have again the
 like Opportunity. ’Twas the Apostle’s Command, *to mark
 them that cause Divisions in the Church*; and all civiliz’d Na-
 tions are as much oblig’d to mark and avoid those that
 occasion Divisions in the State.

At such a Juncture as this, when the Sovereignty of the
 Nation is called in question, and our Right of settling our
 Succession disputed by the *French King*, who is ready to
 swallow up all *Europe*, it would consummate our Mis-
 fortunes to have the two Houses of Parliament engaged in
 such a Controversie about their Rights and Priviledges as
 cannot be accommodated, or let fall, without risking the Ho-
 nour of the Houses, or a new Dissolution. In that Case
 the Nation would be in danger of an Intestine War, to
 settle her own Constitution, instead of carrying on a Forreign
 War against the common Enemy. Might it not then be

proper for us in such Circumstances to follow the Example of King *David*; who being a Man according to God's own Heart, must needs have been habitually a good Justiciary; and yet we find that when the Publick was in danger, he deferred the Execution of Justice upon very great Criminals, till a more proper Season, as in the Case of *Joab* and others. Certainly the Argument is much stronger, when the Persons accused offer to defend themselves, by positively denying one part of the Charge, and by justifying the other part by the Laws and Customs of their Country. If such a Prosecution should be rais'd in a City, when in danger of being attack'd by a common Enemy, it's no hard Matter to conjecture what the Thoughts of the Citizens would be of those that foment such an untimely Prosecution, or if some Soldiers and Officers; nay, if a whole Army, who perhaps have Cause enough to complain of some of their chief Leaders, should move to have them call'd to an Account just when an Enemy is marching upon them, has made himself Master of their Out-Posts, and beat in their Advanced Guards, it's well enough known what a Council of War would determine concerning such Officers, and what Opinion the Country would have of such an Army.

What we are next to consider, is the Way of managing the War. 'Twould seem to fall naturally to our Share to act most of our part by Sea. As this will be least chargeable to the Nation, so by this Means we are like to do the Enemy most Damage both in *Europe* and *America*, and to receive most Advantage to ourselves, especially considering that by the Sixth Article of our Treaty with the Emperor, the *Dutch* and we are impowered to keep to our selves what we conquer in the *West-Indies*. The *Dutch* to be sure will make their Improvement of this Article if we don't; and therefore it seems naturally to be our Interest to be at least as strong by Sea in the *West-Indies* as they; our Concern in those Parts is certainly much greater than theirs, and therefore our Care of them ought to be nothing less. In the mean time I cannot but take notice by the way, that as this Article is an infallible Evidence of His Majesties Care and Kindness to his People, it also corresponds with the Advice given His Majesty, when about the Treaty of Partition, by the Lord *Sommers*, and yet nothing less than the Ruin of that Peer would satisfy some fiery and ambi-

ambitious Spirits, who have been ready at all times to sacrifice the Interest of the Nation to their own Revenge, Covetousness and Ambition. It's evident that that noble Lord in his Letter of *Aug. 28. 1698.* to the King concerning that Treaty, advis'd His Majesty, *That if the Elector of Bavaria, who was to be the Gainer by His Majesties Interposition in that Affair, should come to an Agreement, to let the English into some Trade to the Spanish Plantations, or in any other Manner, it would wonderfully indear His Majesty to his English Subjects.* * Then certainly the obtaining of such a Concession as this, cannot fail of indearing His Majesty to us much more.

But to return to our purpose; as our acting vigorously in the *West-Indies* affords us a Prospect of most Advantage to our selves, it gives us likewise an Opportunity of annoying the Enemy in the most sensible part. The *French King* wants the Assistance of the Treasures of *Spain* in the *West-Indies*, more than the Forces of the Dominions of *Spain* in *Europe*; to arrive at his Idol of Universal Monarchy. By preventing his having the *West-India* Bullion and Mines, we cut off the Sinews of his War, and shall quickly oblige him to drop his Sword. That we may easily do this, can scarcely be denied; we have strong Colonies in the *West-Indies* already, and with what we send in our Ships from *England*, may soon have Men enough from our Northern and Southern Plantations, to make our selves Masters of such Posts in the Spanish *West-Indies*, as will secure us in the Command of that Country. By this Means we shall be freed from our Dependance upon the *Spaniards*, as to our Trade for Slaves and Bullion; and by Consequence, not only enabled to carry on our *East-India* Trade without exporting our own Coin, but likewise by the Conveniency of the *Isthmus* of *Darien*, have an Opportunity of humbling *France* yet further, by cutting off her *East India* Trade, or making it very insignificant. This may easily be done, for we have such Conveniency of sending Men from our *American* Colonies so speedily, and in such Numbers over that *Isthmus*, as may soon destroy their Factories in the *East-Indies*; and besides, by having a Harbour on the South; and another on the North of *Darien*, we shall so much shorten our *East-India* Voyages, and so much lessen the Expence of 'em, that we shall quickly outdo all other Nations that would rival us in that Trade.

To this 'tis objected, that it may imbroil us with the *Dutch* and the *Scots*; but the Answer is easie; 'twill not be hard to compromise Matters with those two Nations.—The *Dutch* being by the Article equal Sharers in the Priviledge, there's no reason to deny them that due Proportion of the Advantage which may any wise

justly be accruing from it; and as to what each Nation is already possessed of in the *East-Indies*, their respective Properties may be secur'd by Treaty. For what relates to the *Scots*, they must be suppos'd to included in the Treaty, as Subjects to the King of *Great Britain*, and the Justice of their Pretensions to *Darien* being asserted by their Parliament; 'twould seem to be necessary that this Matter should be adjusted by a Deputation from both Kingdoms, wherein 'tis not to be doubted but the *Scots* will listen to Reason; by this Means we have an Opportunity of doing them Justice, of coming in with them as Shareis of their Pretensions, and of having an equivalent for admitting them into an Union with us, that they have so long desired, and which by this Method may be cemented for ever. If this be the case, we may have a strong Assistance of Men from that Kingdom, which will then become a part of our own; and all Disputes about their falling in with a distinct Successor are obviated for ever. But be that how it will, it's the undoubted Interest of *England* to take care that no other European Nation become Masters of that Neck of Land, the Importance of which is now become so universally known by the Attempt of the *Scots* to fix themselves there, that if we neglect it, there's no Question to be made but some others will fall in with it, from whom we are not to expect such good Neighbourhood or Advantageous Conditions. Besides, by falling in with them, we keep the Title wholly in the Hands of *Great Britain*, and by that Meansexclude all posteriour Claims.

So much may suffice as to our attacking the *French* or the *Spaniards* in the *West-Indies*; for they must now be reckoned one and the same, till such time as the *Spaniards* are enabled to deliver themselves from the *French* Yoke.

It falls naturally under our Consideration in the next place, in what other Parts we may attack the *French* to most Advantage. The *Neiberlands*, of which they are now possess'd, is so strong, that all we can propose to do on that side, is to keep on the Defensive; for should we attack them there, we must be obliged to dispute every Foot of Ground. We cannot march two or three Leagues without having a Stop put in our way by a fortified Town; so that to fight in that Country, were to run our Heads against a brazen Wall. If we attack them on the other side of *Germany*, we shall be almost in as bad a Condition, for there they have form'd such a strong Barrier by *Luxemburg*, *Mentz*, *Toul*, *Verdun*, *Stratsburg*, *New-Brisac*, &c. that we shall only throw away our Men and our Money.—The *Germans* and *Dutch* are both so sensible of this, that they are wholly taken up in preparing for Defence by Lines, Forts, Redoubts, and numerous Armies.

To attacque them by Land on the side of *Italy* is impracticable, because the Dutchies of *Milan* and *Savoy*, and the Principality of *Piedmont* are at their Command. It remains therefore, that we must either attacque them on the side of the Channel, or on that of the Mediterranean. To attacque them from the Channel would to us seem the easiest and cheapest Method, but their Coasts are dangerous for our Shipping, and we have no footing in their Country to land an Army, as formerly we had; so that unless we could secure our selves of a Place of Arms, and a Magazine, on their Coast, all that we can do on that side is to harraß them, by making frequent Descents, and burning their Country. This would put them to a mighty Charge, fatigue their Militia, interrupt their Commerce, hold *Paris*, the Seat of their Government, in a continual Allarm, and oblige them to keep part of their Naval Force in the Channel, which would weaken their Efforts by Sea in the Mediterranean, and the *West-Indies*, and by Land in the *Netherlands*, *Germany* and *Italy*.

From the Channel we may likewise attacque the Coasts of *Portugal* and *Spain*; which being now the Allies of *France*, 'tis almost the same thing as if we attacqued themselves; for the *French* must be at the Charge of the Defence, otherwise those Kingdoms being unable to bear it, must quickly abandon their Maritime Towns and Provinces to be plundered by us at Discretion, which would in a little time bring them to a Sense of their true Interest, and oblige them to break off their Engagements with *France*.

The next thing to be considered is to attacque them in the Mediterranean; for our Attacques on this side of the *Streights* we might be furnish'd from our own Coasts, and on all Occasions have Recourse to the Harbours of *England* and *Ireland*; and being once passed the *Streights*, the *Spanish* Coast lyes open and defenceless enough; from thence we fall in upon the *French* Coast of *Languedoc* and *Provence*; which, except at *Toulon* and *Marseilles*, is not capable of making much Resistance; and if once we ride Admiral of those Seas, the *Spanish* Dominions in *Italy* revolt to the Emperor of Course, by which we secure our selves of Provisions in that Country, cut off the *French*, *Turky* and *Barbary* Trade, protect our own Commerce to those Countries, and give the Emperor an Opportunity of turning the main of his Force against the *French* upon the *Rhine*; so that finding themselves beset on all Hands, they must speedily submit to such Conditions as the Emperor and his Allies would propose to them.

The principal Objection against this will be, that we have not Naval Force enough to carry on all these Attacques, considering that *France*, *Spain* and *Portugal*, have each of them their Fleets,

ed, that *England* and *Holland* are known to be the chief Maritime Powers of *Europe*; and therefore it's hard to imagine that Two such wealthy and potent Nations cannot fit out Three strong Squadrons; which if they do with sufficient Provisions, and under good Command, the Naval Power of *France*, *Portugal* and *Spain*, is in no Condition to make Head against us. Besides, we must look upon the *Portuguese* and *Spaniards* to be like Men that are press'd into the Service, and that by Consequence will desert as soon as ever they see a fit Opportunity. From all this it is undeniably evident, that the principal Efforts of the *English* and *Dutch* must be by Sea; and it is a known and undoubted Maxim, that such as are Masters there, will soon be the like at Land.

To conclude this Point with an Observation or two. I remember to have heard, that General *Blake*, in the time of the Usurper, being sent to Sea with a limited Commission, he either could or would do nothing against the Enemy; but afterwards, when he had a discretionary Commission, he acted Wonders. Answerable to this I find to be one of *John de Wit's* and *Van Aitzma's* Observations; that during the War betwixt the *Dutch* and *Spain*, the Men of War that acted by the Stadtholders Commission, did neither annoy the Enemy, nor protect their own Trade to any Purpose; but the Ships fitted out by the Merchants of *Amsterdam*, and other private Hands, did both of 'em effectually; because they were under no such Limitations as those belonging to the *States*. Besides, they acted with no other View but the Preservation of their Trade, and humbling the Enemy; whereas they alledge, that the Stadtholder was more intent upon spinning out the War to establish his own Authority, than to bring it to a speedy Conclusion to the Advantage of the Country; and therefore the Commanders that were under his Influence acted but faintly. May it not then deserve our Consideration, whether 'twere not fit to give our Admirals a more ample and unlimited Power; and likewise to encourage our Merchants and others to fit out Men of War, as the *Dutch* Merchants did, to protect their Trade, and to act against the Enemy as Occasion offers? This would be one effectual way to prevent the betraying of Orders. For 'tis scarcely possible to have any Cabinet so closely shut, but *French* Leuidores will find a Pick-lock to open it. If this be thought advisable by the great Council of the Nation, we have no reason to doubt of His Majesty's Concurrence; he hath graciously promis'd to agree to any thing that is needful to prevent our falling again under Arbitrary Power, and by the Peace of *Reswick* gave a sufficient Proof, that he prefers the saving of our Blood and Treasure to his personal Safety.

In order to make all these *Projects* effectual, Expedition and Dispatch are principally requisite. Our Experience may teach us *the Danger of Delay*, for had we been in a posture fit to have made a stand against the impetuous Torrent of French Usurpation, *Spain* had not been forced to throw her self as a *Prey* into the Arms of *France*. *Portugal* had not been forced to enter into a *League* with both of them; the Dutch had not been obliged to quit their Footing in the Spanish Netherlands, and to evacuate the *Garrisons* there without receiving their Money; nor had they been put to a Necessity of drawing their Country, of raising such a vast Army, or of owning the Duke of Anjou as King of Spain, &c. nor should we in England have had the Dishonour of being obliged to follow their Example in that Particular, nor have been put to the Trouble and Expence of furnishing them Land Forces and Men of War, according to the Treaty of 1677. The Venetians had been under no Necessity of being so shy in favouring the Imperial Army in Italy. The Neapolitans might have carried on their Plot, without being suppressed and massacred. The Duke of Mantua had been under no Tentation to sell his Country to France. The Electors of Cologne and Bavaria would have had no shadow of Pretext for betraying and abandoning the Empire. Liege, Bonne, Keyferswart and Rhineberg had not now been in the Hands of France, nor had Louis XIVth's Naval Force been superiour to ours in the West-Indies.

If this Kingdom send such Representatives to Parliaments as will make good the things that they have so frankly promised in their Addresses, we have no reason to doubt, but most of those Clouds will disappear which now obscure our Horizon. The Zeal of the Nation will then be exerted in vigorous Efforts against the common Enemy, and not spent in Party Quarrels and intestine Broyles.

Nor will the good Effects of this be confin'd within the narrow Limits of this single Island: Its Influences must

spread univerſally over *Chriſtendom*. They will have a quick and immediate Effect upon the Councils and Proceedings of the Dutch, who when they find *England* in good Earneſt, will be encourag'd to act ſo too. This will ſoon extinguiſh or make of little uſe to the French, all the before-mention- ed Differences in *Holland* and the Empire, our Influence will give ſuch a Weight to the other Scale as muſt add new Life and Vigour to the Emperor, and ſuch other Princes as eſpouſe his Cauſe. 'Twill revive the Courage of the *Auſtrian* Party in *Italy*, and make their Deſigns to ſhake off the *Bourbon* Yoke ſucceſſful. Had we but a commanding Naval Force in the *Mediterranean*, 'twould certainly bring over *Naples*, *Sicily* and *Sardinia* to the Emperor, and moſt of the Princes and States of *Italy* would fall into his Inter- eſts, tho' we ſhould do nothing elſe towards it, but viſit their Ports, and buy Oyl and Wine. There's no Man can doubt of this that allows himſelf to conſider, what juſt Cauſe of Jealouſie all the *Italians* have of the Growth of the French King's Power, and how glad they would be to ſee him reduc'd. There's none that would more rejoyce at ſuch a Mortification, than the Court of *Rome*, the Republick of *Venice*, the Great Duke of *Tuſcany*, and Republick of *Genoa*, they all of them dread his Neighbourhood by Land and his Power by Sea, whereas they have not the ſame Reaſon to dread the Houſe of *Auſtria* on that Account. 'Tis known that the Emperor has no Naval Force, that he is neither abſolute nor Hereditary Sovereign of the Empire, that his own Dominions are not ſo large nor ſo well ſituated to invade *Italy* as thoſe of *France*; nor is his Sway in his Hereditary Countries any thing ſo abſolute as that of *Louis XIV.*

We have no reaſon to deſpair of Succeſs in bringing down the Exor- bitant Power of *France*, had we but Courage and Honeſty to ſet about it effectually. Heaven hath declar'd for us in the beginning, and made the Emperor when in a manner abandoned by all Mankind, ſucceſſful in *Italy* to a Wonder.

As it is certain that the French King hath a greater Force and Treafure at his Command than any other Prince, that ever yet attempted the Uni- verſal Monarchy, it is as certain that the Emperor, *England*, and *Holland*, are Maſters of a much greater Force and Treafure than any Princes and Potentates that ever yet Leagu'd together at one time to oppoſe it. What Prince do we read of in Hiſtory that ever had ſuch a Naval Force under his Command, as his Maſteſty King *William*, who has that of *England* and *Holland* at his Call, and by his Inter-eſt in the Northern Crowns may have more if it be needful? then what humane Reaſon can any Man alledge to make us deſpair of Succeſs, with ſuch a Power, under ſuch a Command, and imploy'd in ſuch a Cauſe. It will not be denied by any reaſonable Man that has but a tollerable Acquaintance with Religion, and the publick Tranſacti- ons of the World, that if we ſeek and rely upon the Divine Aſſiſtance with any Meaſure of Sincerity, our Quarrel will entitle us to the Bleſſing of Hea- ven as ſoon as 'twill our Enemies. Then humanely ſpeaking, there's nothing can defeat us, but want of Courage, Wiſdom and Honeſty, and if the De-
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sign should miscarry in our Hands, whilst we are thus Circumstantiate; the Blame will be certainly charg'd upon the latter. We and the Dutch together under the Conduct of a Woman, brought down the House of *Austria* when they bid fair for the Universal Monarchy. Then what else but want of Honesty can hinder our doing the like against the House of *Bourbon*? We are certainly much richer than we were then. Our Fleet now exceeds what it was in Queen *Elizabeth's* time beyond all Comparison. Our *West-India* Plantations, which enable us if we have any good Conduct to make our selves Masters of the French and Spanish Treasure, are infinitely Stronger and Richer then in her time. We have *Scotland* united, *Ireland* in Peace and entirely Subjected, neither of which were so at that Juncture, and as to the Dutch, 'tis known they were then indeed the Poor and Distressed, but are now as really the High and Mighty States of *Holland*, they are without all doubt incomparably Stronger and Richer than at that time; and which is still an unspeakable Advantage that was wanting then, we are both under the Conduct of one Prince fam'd for his Valour and Wisdom. To this we must add, which is also highly Considerable, that the House of *Austria* and most of the Empire is certainly on our side. This is a Thing of mighty Consequence, not only because of their own Hereditary Dominions and Interest in the Princes of the Empire, but likewise because of their Interest in *Italy* and in the Spanish Dominions, where many of the *Grandeos* and others want only an Opportunity to shake off the French Yoak.

We are also to consider, for our Encouragement, that the Enemy we have to deal with, hath by an Infatuation from above, exceedingly weakned his Kingdom, by an ungrateful as well as impolittick Persecution of his Protestant Subjects, and by a long and unjust War. The Effects of this are visible in the Decay of his Trade, and the Consumption of his Money, which puts him upon those inglorious and oppressive Methods to raise more, that we have a daily Account of in his Edicts and Declarations. Besides, his Ambition to grasp at the whole Spanish Monarchy, puts him to a vast Additional Expence of Men and Money, and obliges him to send great Sums as well as great Armies out of his Country to defend his new Usurpations by Bribery and Force. This is just as if the Spirits should retire from the Heart to the Extremities of the Body, the Consequences of which must needs be fatal. He is under a Necessity to act thus, for he himself hath done so much towards the Ruine and Impoverishment of *Spain*, ever since his Accession to the Throne that the Spaniards are in no Condition to support his Grandson's Pretensions, admitting they were really zealous to do so. 'Tis this alone, that will hasten his Ruine and make him fall a Sacrifice to his own Ambition, if we and the Dutch take but any tollerable Care to prevent his being supported by the American Plate Fleets: Which if we don't, it will be impossible for us to escape the Imputation of Folly and Treachery.

We have still this Great and Capital Encouragement to go heartily into a War; That by the League with the Emperor we are empowered to keep what we conquer in the *West-Indies*. The last War was wholly carried on at
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our own Charge, without any hopes of being repayed; but we have now a Prospect, nay, a Certainty of carrying it on at the Charge of our Enemies; if we fail in this, we cannot fix it upon the want of a due Care in the King our Sovereign, or upon the want of a generous Gratitude in the Emperor our Allie; so that the Blame will unavoidably fall upon our own Mismanagement; but it's hoped the approaching Parliament will readily assist his Majesty to prevent that. We are the more obliged to take a particular Care in this, because if we don't improve it, there's nothing can be more fatal to us, for if we neglect or happen to miscarry in the Attempt, there's nothing in the Earth that could so much rivet the generality of the Spaniards in the Interest of *France*, and by Consequence that can enable *Louis XIV.* and his Successors to go on with the design of the Universal Monarchy; for that bountiful Concession from the Emperor will certainly have much greater influence to make the Spaniards live quietly under the French King's Yoke, than the Treaty of Partition could possibly have to make them accept his Grandson; and therefore it's hoped this Nation will take care that what was intended as our great Benefit, may not become an irreparable Loss.

To draw towards a Conclusion. If we may judge of the Temper of the Kingdom, by the Addresses of the People, we have reason to conclude, that tho' there were no such prospect of Advantage by a War upon the Spanish *West-Indies*, they are willing to bear their proportion of the Charge to bring down the exorbitant Power of *France*, and to have Satisfaction for the Affront He hath put upon the Nation, by offering to entail an Impostor on our Throne. 'Tis hoped these Addresses will stop the Mouths of such as formerly oppos'd a War, on the Account of the People's unwillingness to engage in a new one. For now we have Assurance of the contrary from themselves. And as this must needs be a great Encouragement to our Allies, who are thereby convinced of the Truth of what his Majesty told them, that they may rely upon us; it likewise keeps up the Character of the People of *England*, as a Wise and Magnanimous Nation, who know when a War is necessary, and have Courage to declare their Willingness to go into it, when they know it to be so.

May Heaven succeed our Efforts till *France* be brought as low as to be no more a Terror to *Europe*, and till she be obliged to abandon the Pretender. Since *Oliver* forced the French King to banish our Princes, whose Legitimacy was never controverted; 'twill be truly unaccountable if we should not have the like Success against the Impostor. We have all imaginable Reason to expect it, if Heaven preserve us from Treachery and ill Conduct; for the Prince whose Title he has usurp'd is the known Hero of his Age, has a commanding Interest in *Holland*, has the Emperor and the greatest Princes of the Empire for his Allies, has all the reason of the World to expect the Assistance of the Northern Crowns, is universally beloved by his own Subjects in all the three Kingdoms, and has Justice on his side.

F I N I S.